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I.

Introduction

Helicopters can provide unique support for various kinds of public safety activities.
Best practices from California and other states raise the specter of liability for publicsafety agencies do not use helicopter support. Yet most public safety agencies cannot
afford them.4 Deploying helicopters to support multiple agencies on a shared basis
would help fill the gap, as would overcoming a cultural bias in the pilot community
against smaller helicopters.
As in most areas of human endeavor, the law does not determine how helicopter
technology can enhance public safety; imagination, creativity, entrepreneurship, and
politically astute pragmatism are the engines of integrating technology with reality. The
law, however, shapes the result by providing mechanisms for cooperation and, when it
is well-conceived, incentives to use best available technology. This precept is true with

4

Some 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies exist in the United States. Half employ ten or

fewer sworn officers. United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Local Police,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=71 (summarizing statistics). Communities with smaller
populations obviously have less tax revenue to support any of their operations.
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respect to helicopter support for public safety activities. The law offers structures for
sharing expensive aviation assets, and it may provide incentives for using helicopters.
Air-One Emergency Response Coalition, a volunteer organization that provides
helicopter support for public safety agencies in northern Illinois and southern
Wisconsin, represents an attractive model for making helicopter assets more widely
available. It demonstrates what is possible when proponents of enhanced public safety
are willing to consider new approaches, and when passionate, effective advocates
educate the public and the public safety community.
This article begins by explaining how helicopters aid tactical public-safety operations,
including law enforcement, search and rescue, and disaster response management. It
evaluates organizational alternatives for making helicopters available on a shared basis
and suggests ways to lower perceived barriers—in Illinois and elsewhere. It concludes
that sharing is possible almost anywhere, that smaller, cheaper, helicopters can do the
job, and that flexibility is necessary to assure a continuing supply of pilots.
The authors, two of whom are helicopter pilots, and one of whom is a Marine Corps
reservist drilling with individuals trained in ground control of air assets, have had
several discussions with the leadership of Air-One and have participated in Air-One
tactical training missions. They have met or talked on the telephone with law
enforcement and EMS personnel all over the country and with helicopter
manufacturers, and have ridden on airborne patrol missions with the Los Angeles and
the Fontana, California, police departments.

II.
Comparison of alternative means for managing public safety
incidents

Helicopters play a supporting role to ground resources. Public Safety ground forces
offer the advantage of physical proximity. Police personnel can effect physical restraint
and apprehend suspects when they get close enough. They can immediately administer
medical treatment to a victim of an accident, criminal attack, or natural disaster.
Helicopters can do none of these things.
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But ground forces have limited mobility. Police officers on foot may or may not be able
to outrun a fleeing individual; they may lose sight of their target as the target runs
around corners, jumps over fences, or hides behind walls or bushes.5 On foot, they
cannot chase down vehicles.
Ground vehicles offer the advantage of faster speeds, compared with personnel on foot,
but they are seriously limited in their mobility, being confined to streets and alleys and
able to operate off-road only in terrain relatively free of obstacles. Their visual field is
only slightly better than personnel on foot. Pursuing fleeing vehicles creates risks to
police officers and to the general public.
Helicopters6 easily overcome these limitations. Helicopters can fly at 130 miles per hour
over traffic jams, or they can fly slowly to keep pace with a suspect fleeing on foot. They
can land and take off from any place slightly larger than the dimensions of the
helicopter. Helicopters are, however, expensive.7
Ultimately, drones may displace manned helicopters for some law enforcement patrol
support because of their lower cost,8 but this is unlikely to happen any time soon.9 Use
See generally Jack H. Schonely, Apprehending Fleeting Suspects (2005) [hereinafter “Fleeing Suspects”].
Both fixed wing aircraft (airplanes) and helicopters can be invaluable adjuncts to ground-based publicsafety operations, but their characteristics make them useful for different purposes. Airplanes fly faster
and are better for longer-range missions. Helicopters can fly slower, down to a speed of zero (a
phenomenon known as “hovering"), and are better for missions that require staying close to a scene.
Airplanes stay in the air because their wings generate lift proportional to their forward speed. Below of
speed of about sixty-five miles per hour, an airplane wing “stalls.” When a wing stalls air stops flowing
smoothly over it, and it no longer generates lift. A stall has nothing to do with the engine quitting.
Helicopters depend, not on forward speed, but spinning of their rotors to generate lift. They thus can fly
at any speed and hover (remain stationary while flying) as long as the engine is turning the rotor.
7 Their operating costs are high. See § IV.A for a chart showing helicopter operating costs. Costs for fixedwing aircraft used in public safety missions range from $140-190 per hour. See
https://www.conklindd.com/CDALibrary/ACCostSummary.aspx (table of values computed by
commercial aircraft evaluation service). Fuel costs alone are $325-$965 per hour. Using the fuel
consumption figures from the comparison chart in and a Jet A fuel price of $6.78. They have high
acquisition and maintenance costs. The State of Ohio estimates the cost of a 100-hour inspection for an
AS350 at $4,541, and the cost of a 500-hour inspection at $10,180.
www.dot.state.oh.us/Divisions/ContractAdmin/Contracts/.../092-13a.xls. This represents an additional
$65.77 per hour in direct operating costs.
5

6

8

The general perception is that drones will be much cheaper to purchase and to operate than manned

aircraft. Identifying credible prices is difficult, however, because the civilian drone industry is in its
infancy. One vendor of very small rotary-wing drones with payload capability less than 1.5 kg and
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of law-enforcement drones raises vigorously debated questions about safety of flight,10
privacy, and security.11
Lower cost12 will always be offset by inherent limitations. For one thing, their safety and
utility requires maintaining the integrity of a line-of-sight wireless link.13 It is one thing
if the ground controller loses communication with a military drone flying well over
contested enemy or ungoverned territory. The drone simply crashes, and property
damage or injuries resulting from the crash can be chalked up to "collateral damage” in
an armed conflict. 14 That would hardly be the case if a law-enforcement drone were
endurance times on the order of 30 minutes publishes prices from €20,000 to €40,000 for complete
systems, including the ground control console. http://www.microdrones.com/purchase/purchase-amicrodrone-platform-at-microdrones.php. A U.S.-based vendor of a roughly equivalent machine prices it
at $1,200, but it aims at the hobbyist/consumer market. http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision/.
Another U.S. vendor, aiming at the industrial market, belittles hobbyist competitors and quotes prices of
$55,000 for a fixed-wing vehicle. http://www.falcon-uav.com/pricing/.
Any estimate of operating cost would be entirely speculative, because too little is known about regulatory
requirements, operator qualifications, and labor markets.
9 See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012) (requiring FAA
to speed up certification of drone use by law enforcement). The FAA released its first five-year unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) “roadmap”—a preliminary first step to regulatory action-- on 8 November 2013.
Federal Aviation Administration, Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National
Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap (1st ed. 2013),
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAS_Roadmap_2013.pdf See also Villansenor, 36 Harv.
J. L. & Pub. Pol'y at 470-471 (reviewing FAA regulatory framework for drones).
10 Villansenor, 36 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y at 473-475 (explaing unique safety concerns associated with
drone operations).
11 See John Villasenor, Observations From Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 Harv. J. L. &
Pub. Pol'y 457 (2013) [hereinafter "Villasenor"] (predicting that drones will "dominate the future of
aviation and analyzing safety and privacy issues"); id. at 461-468 (reviewing unmanned aircraft systems
technology and its history)
12 See Villansenor, 36 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y at 467 (claiming law enforcement drone operating costs of
$25 per hour). It is too early to tell whether their acquisition cost will be lower. Section XXX discusses
helicopter costs.
13 See Micah Zenko, Ten Things You Didn't Know About Drones, Foreign Policy, item #2 (March/April
2012), http://www.cfr.org/drones/ten-things-you-didnt-know-drones/p27497 (reporting that drones tend
to crash frequently, often due to lost data links). “Line of sight” means that a drone’ radio antenna must
be within a straight line from the ground station antenna. Over-the horizon communications is not
possible.
14 See Idyli Tsakiri Karatzaferi, Collateral damage caused by drones: Crime or accident? (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=215895 (quoting DOD official on collateral
damage resulting from drone mishaps).
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flying over a congested area of New York, Dallas, or Chicago when communication is
lost. It is very difficult to assure 100% integrity of wireless links with moving aircraft. 15
Moreover, maintaining traffic separation from other drones and from manned aircraft is
a problem that has not been solved yet.
Use of manned helicopters by public safety agencies is well accepted;16 public
controversy and the difficulty of developing an appropriate regulatory framework for
drones are likely to delay their widespread deployment in public-safety applications.
Eventually, however, the FAA will permit drone operations from relatively low heights
when they are kept within the view of the operator, and when line-of-sight radio
communication is maintained. Under those restrictions, a ground-based law
enforcement unit to which a skilled drone operator is attached could launch a rotarywing drone to operate in the immediate area of a barricade situation. Such a drone
equipped with color and infrared imaging could search an area obscured by structures,
foliage, or terrain, or hazardous for ground personnel to penetrate. But this is a far cry
from drones’ flying patrol over a major part of Lake County Illinois17 or the northern
half of Los Angeles.18 Drones are incapable of missions requiring insertion or extraction
of personnel and cargo.
For now, drones are irrelevant to most public safety missions, although this will change
over the next five-to-ten years.
Anyone who flies electronic news gathering (“ENG”) helicopters can attest to that. Co-author Sprague
regularly operates the camera and downlink equipment on EGN helicopters, and deals with lost links
often.
Radio control links can be made more robust. Communications designs used for space-system control can
be adapted to drone control, although two major challenges would need to be addressed. First, the data
rate required to control space systems is small, compared to data rate to transmit the necessary signals to
control an aircraft – particularly a rotary wing aircraft. The data rate for image transmission back to the
control station is similar; it depends, not on whether the system is flying in space or the atmosphere, but
rather on the desired image resolution and frame rate. The line of sight restriction for most aircraft
communication is not a problem for spacecraft, because the line of sight is virtually infinite
16 See Jay Stanley, We Already Have Police Helicopters, So What’s the Big Deal Over Drones?,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-criminal-law-reform/we-already-have-policehelicopters-so-whats-big-deal (explaining why drones raise more public policy concerns than lawenforcement helicopters).
17 Lake County comprises 1368 square miles.
18 The city of Los Angeles comprises 503 square miles.
15
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III.

Mission profiles

Three basic types of public safety activities can benefit from helicopter support: law
enforcement, search-and-rescue, and disaster relief.19 Equipment and flight profiles
differ according to the mission type, although some common themes exist.
This section analyzes the most common types of public safety operations in which
helicopter support may be useful. In each case, the analysis offers guidance on best
practice and illustrates details of how helicopters can provide support. In all cases, air
crew familiarity with ground features is essential. When advance planning for a specific
mission is infeasible, the TFO20 and pilot use enroute time to familiarize themselves
with street names and major features on the ground.21 Inbound aircrews can get much
of the geographic information they need from listening carefully to tactical ground
communications while they are inbound.22
1.
Law enforcement
Law-enforcement missions comprise three broad types: patrol, incident response, and
barricade situations. Only barricade- and some incident-response situations involve
military-style hierarchical command-and-control.23 In most law-enforcement operations,
the first responder unit is in charge.
a)

Patrol

The best helicopter support for routine law-enforcement support is for the helicopter to
be airborne and participating more or less as if it were a patrol car. This provides

Emergency medical services helicopter support is usually provided by non-governmental hospitals in
cooperation with private contractors. See § V.B.
20 As section XXX explains, virtually all missions require both a pilot and a Tactical Flight Officer
(“TFO”).
21 Means at 40, 55 (suggesting familiarity with street names before helicopter arrives on station).
22 Schonely at 46.
23 While the civilian public-safety context is significantly different from military contexts, what the Army
and Marine Corps have learned can be given weight and adapted to certain civilian contexts. Good police
officers work on their own or in pairs and must utilize a wider range of discretion than individual
soldiers. See Kevin Means, Tactical Helicopter Missions: How to Fly Safe, Effective Airborne Law
Enforcement Missions (2007) [hereinafter “Means”] (detailing various law enforcement operations, few of
them depending on “incident commanders” and command posts). Some public safety missions, however,
such as search and rescue, fire suppression, mass shooter incidents, and natural disaster relief do benefit
from hierarchical organization. There, Army and Martine Corps doctrine can teach important lessons
about effective deployment of civilian helicopters.
19

8

immediate availability to detect suspicious persons, to aid ground-based units in
stopping and questioning them, or to catch someone who is fleeing from a crime just
committed. When helicopters are not already in the air, utility of helicopter patrol
support depends on readiness of the crew and the time it takes them to get the
helicopter airborne.24
Kevin Means25 articulates basic rules of thumb for helicopter patrol:
•

Don't hover; it impairs sightlines for TFO and pilot, makes the activities of the
helicopter more obvious to subjects, and raises safety concerns

•

Fly at or above 500 feet AGL, and at speeds of 50 to 60 knots

•

Adjust orbits so that legs26 from which the subject is obscured by buildings or
other obstacles are flown faster, maximizing dwell time on the legs from which
the subject can be seen.

•

Set up orbits so that they have an appropriate horizontal offset: typically one- to
one-and-a-half blocks. Appropriate offsets, combined with the right speed and
altitude result in an ideal sight angle of about 60 degrees.27

Actually flying airborne patrols in Los Angeles and Fontana, California, validates most
of Means’ precepts, although it calls into question his more ambitious assertions about
reliance on infrared imagery.28

24

On 20 December, 2013, co-author Perritt, Faulkner, and four other members of the Fontana, California,

helicopter team, three flight officers and two pilots, were discussing the air support operation in the small
suite of offices adjoining the hanger. A radio call came over the hailing channel requesting helicopter
support for ground units responding to an armed robbery of a retail store. The R66 parked on the ramp
had already been preflighted. The helicopter was in the air in less than six minutes, and over the scene in
another five, beginning to orbit to gain an understanding of what kind of perimeter had been set up and
to get a better description of the getaway car.
Kevin Means, Tactical Helicopter Missions: How to Fly Safe, Effective Airborne Law Enforcement
Missions (2007) [hereinafter “Means”].
26 The “leg” of an orbit is one side; e.g. the upwind side.
27 Means also offers detailed protocols for effective helicopter use in vehicle chases, both high-speed and
low-speed. See Means chap.7 (vehicle pursuits).
25

28

On 19 December, 2013, co-author Perritt flew an airborne patrol in an LAPD AS350B2, equipped with a

FLIR camera, NightSun, moving map display, and binoculars. The helicopter launched at its usual time of
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The Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) is an exemplar of using helicopters as
airborne patrol cars. It has nineteen helicopters. 29 They serve as force multipliers.30 The
LAPD has two helicopters in the air twenty hours a day, with one on standby for the
remaining four hours: 4 AM to 8 AM. The aircrew, comprising a pilot and a TFO,
monitors the citywide "K-9" frequency and the dispatch and car-to-car frequencies of
each division31 it flies over. Calls for a burglary in progress, reports of shots fired, or any
other kind of call that might be aided by helicopter support causes the aircrew to
respond on its own initiative. In some cases, the dispatcher for a division relays a
request for helicopter support; more often a patrolman in a ground unit simply says
over his car-to-car frequency, "Airship, can you come and search some rooftops?” and
gives the location. 32

4 PM with its pilot, TFO, and Perritt aboard. Monitoring both the city-wide “hailing” radio channel and
discrete division frequencies as the helicopter flew across division boundaries,
During the 19 December mission, the helicopter responded to a reported burglary in progress of an
occupied house, assisted in setting up a perimeter, and searched the neighborhood. It assisted with a
rooftop search in another part of the city. It flew the high part of a high-low mission over a barricaded
suspect. It monitored traffic stops.
On 20 December 2013, co-author Perritt flew a mission with the Fontana, CA Police Department, during
which the helicopter searched for a vehicle fleeing the scene of an armed robbery, monitored ground
officer safety during traffic stops and watched for suspicious activity by pedestrians and vehicles.
14 Eurocopter AS350B2s and five Bell Jet Ranger B3s
http://www.lapdonline.org/air_support_division/content_basic_view/1179
30 LAPD has a total of 8,000 sworn officers: 17.1 per square-mile and 2.1 per thousand population.
Chicago has 13,000 sworn officers: 57.3 per square mile and 4.6 per thousand population. New York has
36,000: 118.8 per square mile and 4.3 per thousand population. In 2008, New York had 36,000 sworn
officers, Chicago had 13,000, and LA had 8,000. DOJ 2008 Law Enforcement Census at p14 (Appendix
Table 5). In 2008, the population of New York was 8.3 million, of LA 3.8 million, and Chicago 2.8 million.
http://www.biggestuscities.com/2008. New York's area is 303 square miles, LA's is 469, and Chicago's is
227. http://www.census.gov/statab/ccdb/cit1010r.txt
31 An LAPD division is a geographic area that might be called a "precinct" in New York or Boston and
"district" in Chicago.
29

32

The Chicago Police Department follows the LA model but on a much smaller scale. – Chicago has only
two helicopters. Chicago also does not have crews on duty 24 hours/7-days. It operates two shifts on
weekdays, from 8 AM to 4 PM and 8 PM to 2 AM, and 8 PM to 2 AM on Saturday and Sundays.
The goal is to have one of the helicopters in the air during peak prime activity. Six of Chicago's 25 police
districts account for 85% of the crime. Typically one of the CPD Helicopters patrols one of these high
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When a more serious crime requires support, another helicopter diverts from its usual
patrol area, and the two helicopters fly a high/low pattern, both using searchlights if it
is at night, one flying at 300 to 400 feet AGL, while the other flies at 1000 feet AGL.
When not involved in a particular call, the helicopter crew decides, just like a ground
patrol unit would, where it should patrol: “Let's see what's going on down Crenshaw,"
or "let's check out the projects." When the helicopter sees a traffic stop, it orbits to
determine that the officer involved is not in jeopardy.
Considerable detail can be observed from 400-500 feet above ground level. Even an
untrained person would have no difficulty spotting anomalous behavior by vehicle or
pedestrian.
As the helicopter patrols, moving between particular missions, the pilot varies the
helicopter’s height AGL and speed as necessary to enhance safety and mission
effectiveness, typically flying faster at lower altitudes and increasing height when lower
speeds are appropriate.
Little hovering is necessary; as Means argues, orbiting enhances perception of groundbased targets and reduces the likelihood that a structure or a terrain feature would
obstruct visibility of a target33
The Los Angeles and Fontana missions provided an opportunity to bracket the
operating environment—Los Angeles is obviously much bigger than Fontana, and has a
considerably larger air support operation. Los Angeles flies larger turbine helicopters;
Fontana flies one of the smallest turbine helicopters and a piston-engine helicopter.
Nevertheless, only modest differences between the Fontana mission and the LAPD
mission were apparent. For example, the Fontana TFO's intimate familiarity with the
local geography made reliance on the moving map displays less necessary. He almost
never referred to it. Otherwise, the Fontana and LAPD missions were flown similarly,

crime areas, plugged into the frequencies that serve the relevant police districts. The Chicago Police
Department groups its radio frequencies geographically, with two adjacent districts typically sharing the
same frequencies and dispatcher. Conversation with SGT Fred Harnisch.
33 As the sergeant in charge of the Chicago Police Department helicopters said, “We don’t need to hover.
Everything is in the camera.”Conversation with Fred Harnisch.
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with respect to the use of the onboard equipment, and the flight profiles of the
helicopters.
In neither city was formalized, military style, command-and-control necessary. Street
officers, as they usually do, worked quickly as individuals, coordinating as necessary,
without having to take the time to deploy command centers and designate incident
commanders. Ground units on the scene and the helicopter aircrew communicated
directly, understood each others’ needs and capabilities, and took appropriate action.
The same technique worked well even when multiple ground units were on the scene—
as for the burglary situation in Los Angeles and for the robbery in Fontana. In all three,
the helicopter crew assisted in coordinating their placement and activities quickly,
efficiently, and without argument. By tradition, the first responding unit remained in
charge of directing backup units.
Philosophies also differ on mission altitudes. The LA Police Department prefers flying
low: 500 feet AGL or lower. Chicago, Air-One, and San Diego prefer to fly higher: at
least 1000 feet AGL for Chicago,34 and 600-1000 feet AGL for Air-One.35 The dominant
considerations are greater exposure to ground fire and higher risks if an engine fails at
lower altitudes, and generally better visibility and situational awareness at higher
altitudes. With FLIR equipment and a skilled operator, heights of 700 AGL or greater
and horizontal offsets of a mile or more still allow acquisition of very detailed images.36
b)

Barricaded subjects

Situations in which the subject is stationary and has barricaded himself, as in an active
shooter or hostage situation requires a higher degree of organization than patrol
functions. A larger number of ground forces must be deployed effectively and

Harnish.
AIR-ONE Emergency Response Coalition, Inc., PIC Transition Syllabus at pages 11-13 (Aug. 26, 2009,
rev. Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter “PIC Syllabus”]. 600-1000 feet for FLIR searches for stationary objects, PIC
Syllabus at 11; 500-600 feet for vehicle pursuits, PIC syllabus at 12; and 400-600 feet AGL for foot pursuits,
PIC Syllabus at 13.
36 Air-One directs certain lateral offsets and 40-60 knots orbit speed, and cautions against hovering. 1.5-2
blocks offset for non-urgent calls and 0.75 to 1.5 blocks offset and “proportionate airspeed” for FLIR
searches for stationary objects, PIC Syllabus at 11; lateral offset to the right or left of a vehicle being
pursued and behind the vehicle at a speed matching the vehicle’s; the caveat “all turns to the left and no
hovering unless necessary” is repeated for both vehicle and foot pursuits. PIC Syllabus at 12-13
34
35
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helicopter operations must be integrated with the ground operation. It is here that
effective command-and-control is important.
Well defined perimeters are important in many law-enforcement-support operations,
but especially in barricade situations.37 Perimeters limit the movement of fleeing
suspects or vehicles; they provide a means for excluding civilians from areas of high
risk where a shooter or bomber is located. Both ground forces and aircrews must
understand the fundamentals of perimeter establishment and maintenance: solid facts
must exist to place the suspect within the perimeter; it should be large enough to reflect
the suspect’s speed and last-known direction of travel; it must be tight enough to
exclude the possibility that the suspect crossed it without detection.38 Any perimeter
should be defined by how far the subject could have travelled in the time elapsed since
the last contact. Identifying the boundaries of an appropriate perimeter depends on
someone--the incident commander if he has been identified and is functioning, or the
TFO otherwise--thinking quickly to estimate reasonable speeds, to multiply them by
time, and determine distance expressed in miles or blocks. Boundaries of the perimeter
should be chosen, to the extent possible, to permit unobstructed lines of sight, either
from the ground or from the air. Either air or ground personnel must be able to spot
anyone attempting to cross it.
Once the perimeter is established, the helicopter can search from house to house in the
nearby neighborhood to ensure the perpetrator has not escaped and to view other
possibile strategies for ingress, for the police, and egress for the perpetrator. Situational
awareness in this regard is greater from the air than from the ground: the personnel in
the helicopter easily see the big picture.
c)

Surveillance

Surveillance, in comparison to search, comprises an activity once a target has been
acquired: A lost or injured person, or criminal subject the authorities are trying to
apprehend.39 The most appropriate flight profiles are whatever is necessary to keep the

37 Jack H. Schonely, Apprehending Fleeing Suspects: Suspect Tactics and Perimeter Containment (2005)
[hereinafter “Schonely”]
38 Schonely at 14-18.
39 Surveillance also can refer to the monitoring of an area to detect suspicious activity. In this sense, it has
the same meaning as patrol, considered in §III.1.a).
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target in sight. If he is moving in a vehicle, the helicopter needs to keep pace, flying at
the same speed as the vehicle. If he is still, as an injured person might be on the ground,
or criminal suspect who has barricaded himself with or without hostages, the helicopter
needs to be able to hover or fly in a tight circle to watch his movements.
The Boston Marathon bombing increased interest in effective surveillance of high-risk
events where large crowds assemble. Aerial surveillance has unique advantages for
such missions. Overhead, observers can spot unusual movements of vehicles or
individuals quickly—anything that does not match the prevailing flow of participants
or audience, such as an attacker dropping a backpack and walking quickly away.
The challenge, however, is where to look. Means enumerates a number of things to
watch for in any surveillance or search for a criminal suspect:
•

A vehicle driving much slower (on an expressway) or much faster (on residential
streets) than the rest of the traffic

•

A vehicle disregarding stop signs and traffic signals

•

A vehicle stopping occasionally midblock with no one getting out.40

•

He offers charts illustrating how far behind a target vehicle the helicopter should
be flown, varying with vehicle speed, suggests flying an offset of about two
blocks to the ride side of the target vehicle (on a helicopter flown from the right
seat, and shows how to deal with situations in which the helicopter overruns the
target vehicle or when it makes an abrupt turn.41
d)

Collecting evidence

The fact that most public safety helicopters have sophisticated camera equipment
means that they easily can record the images captured. This provides a potentially rich
trove of evidence of criminal activity and police conduct.42 Things must be done,
however, to make this evidence practically useful. First, well-understood chain of

Means at 47 (noting that aircrew should be especially alert when a vehicle stops in a dark area for no
apparent reason).
41 See e.g. Means at 101 (Figure 41) (suggesting a 270-degree turn to the left to permit the TFO to keep in
sight a vehicle making a 90-degree right turn). Co-author Perritt’s flight with the Fontana Police
Department validates this guidance.
42 See Kosakoff v. City of San Diego, No. 08–CV–1819–IEG (NLS), 2010 WL 1759455 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
29, 2010) (referring to helicopter video as evidence of confrontation between police and decedent).
40
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custody requirements43 must be satisfied. Second, the high definition images actually
captured are far more useful than substantially compressed versions of the same
imagery or only periodic frames. Yet the amount of data involved in a full-motion highdefinition video image is enormous, and if the public safety helicopter operation tries to
save everything, any conceivable level of storage will soon be overwhelmed.
Accordingly, some protocol is appropriate to decide what should be retained and what
safely can be erased.
2.
Search and rescue
Search and rescue missions can be divided into two types: those involving search only,
and those involving rescue. Rescue operations may involve human-load operations,44
considered in § III.4.
Search, as contrasted with surveillance, is used in this analysis to refer to efforts to locate
the subject before he has been sighted. Search over a large geographic area is often
conducted according to a grid superimposed on a map. Systematic searching according
to established protocols is more important than in law-enforcement support, because
because SAR operations take more time than the typical law-enforcement incident, and
because SAR traditionally employs more formal command and control. In other
circumstances, however, it is more useful to search according to ground features. The
particular search needs to be defined effectively. For example, “Search Memorial Drive
eastbound to the on ramp for I-95," or “Search from the fishhook bend in the Fox River
just east of Wilmot to the large quarry south of Route 173.”
Lower altitudes are more helpful for surveillance, while somewhat higher altitudes,
around 2000 feet, may be more appropriate for search, because it enables the helicopter
to see more territory.
Containment is an important part of search strategy. It is the same idea as establishing a
perimeter in searching for a fleeing felon:

CITE, summarizing the rules
Also known as “long-line,” signifying that the human load is carried for a significant distance, and
“short-line,” signifying that the human load is carried for only a short distance. The article uses the
regulatory terms “load,” “external load,” “external human load.”
43
44
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"For example, you might have two or three people positioned along on a long straight
road. If the search subject crosses the road, they’ll spot him. Bridges, wide creeks and
open fields often offer the same confinement ability with a minimum of manpower. By
confining the search subject, even if you only have the manpower to confine them on
one or two sides, you immediately limit the area which needs to be searched."45
3.
Natural disaster relief
Helicopters are especially well-suited for providing natural disaster relief. Often,
ground-based infrastructure, such as roads and airports, is destroyed. Helicopters are
the only way to get supplies in quickly. Victims stranded by floodwaters or blizzards
may not survive unless they get food and water without long delays. And, of course, in
some cases, they need to be rescued, or they will perish.
Intelligence collection also is crucial: locating victims, assessing damage, viable inroads,
possible delays for relief, and other disaster management issues.
Smaller helicopters with only basic equipment can be useful for intelligence collection
in natural disasters; however, larger helicopters with more elaborate equipment are
necessary for inserting relief supplies or for rescuing victims.
4.
Personnel insertion and extraction
An occasional law enforcement mission, and many search and rescue missions, require
helicopters to insert or extract personnel. The most straightforward way to do this is to
land and have the personnel get on or off the helicopter. Many rescue situations provide
no place to land, however, such as water and high-rise fire rescues. In these situations,
there must be some way for the rescuers to exit the helicopter and descend to the
ground or for victims or rescuers to be picked up off the ground by the helicopter,
without landing.
Classified as human external load operations ("HEL"), these operations require a high
degree of aircrew training.46 Pilots must to be able to insert and to extract a load gently
into or from a one-square-meter area on the ground and to hover and maintain altitude

Id.
Co-authors Perritt and Cue flew on a training mission with Air-One on 20 November 2013, and rode as
mock victims on the end of a 100-foot load line. They observed aircrew coordination. The maneuvers,
when properly performed, are more gentle than one might expect.

45

46
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precisely. A subcategory of external load operations, they operate under distinct FAA
flight rules.47
Many different equipment configurations exist for extraction, including baskets,
stretchers, and various kinds of slings. Load lines can be fixed in length, ranging from
50 to 150 feet, typically 100 feet. Or, they can be configured so that the load can be
reeled into the helicopter while it is still in flight. The type of extraction equipment best
for a particular mission depends on the condition of the person to be extracted.48
The level of aircrew skill required for HEL is significant. The pilot must be able to
control the helicopter precisely in order to avoid sudden pickups or hard setdowns that
might injure the human load and maintain sufficient altitude to avoid smacking the
load into trees or other obstacles on the ground. In most parts of an HEL operation, the
pilot cannot see the load or the load line. A TFO riding in the back must lean out, often
sitting on the skids and keep the load line and load always in sight.
The TFO communicates with the pilot through the aircraft intercom, using precise
terminology to direct the pilot, typically counting down before the execution of a
command or until a maneuver should cease; e.g., "come up with the load slowly for
five; 5-4-3-2-1," signifying that the pilot should begin a climb immediately and level off
when the countdown ends.
Personnel being inserted assist the TFO in the helicopter by giving hand and leg signals;
e.g., a hand motion upward to signify that the helicopter should climb, a horizontal
motion with the hand to signify that it should hover, and clicking heels together with
legs extended to signify that the load is ten feet above the ground on a descent. The TFO
47

14 C.F.R. Pt 133. Part 133 does not, however, directly address operations or flight profiles for human

loads. Accord Human Factors at 8 (noting that FAR Part 133 contains no explicit provisions relating to
HEL operations and procedures). The FAA amended the FARs in 1999 to add provisions relating to
external loads, but did not impose significantly different operating requirements. 64 Fed.Reg. 43016,
43017 (no special procedures or piloting techniques required by 14 C.F.R. § 29.865(c)(5) or Id. § 133.45 for
human external cargo as opposed to other external cargo). See also See FAA, proposed Rules, Rotorcraft
Load Combination Safety Requirements, 63 Fed.Reg. 37746 (July 13, 1998) (reviewing history of HEL
regulations and revising airworthiness rules for "Class D"--HEL--operations).
See Randa L. Shehab et al, A Human Factors Perspective on Human External Loads, DOT/FSS/AM98/13 at 17 (May, 1998) [hereinafter "Human Factors"].
48
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in the helicopter watches the load and relays instructions to the pilot over the
intercom.49
A number of largely unavoidable hazards exist in HEL operations. A failure by the
helicopter pilot to maneuver the helicopter precisely enough, or a failure by other crew
members to pass signals quickly and unambiguously, may result in a collision between
the human load and ground obstacles. The load line or the attachment points may break
or disconnect. A slack load line may entangle the main or tail rotor. The engine on the
helicopter may fail during pick up, transit, or set down. The flight regime for long line
operations requires prolonged hovering and other maneuvers at relatively low
altitudes. At these altitudes and speeds, if the engine fails in a single-engine
helicopter,50 the pilot needs to maneuver so as to set the load down gently and safely
and then to enter an autorotation to land the helicopter safely. Even the most skilled

Human Factors at 17 (recommending passive device, maintianing upright posture, with separate
spotter to monitor HEL).
50 In a twin engine helicopter losing one engine, autorotation is not necessary. Rather, the helicopter could
49

continue in a normal flight profile until it could safely release the load and land. Worst case, depending
on gross weight and atmospheric conditions, the helicopter would enter a controlled descent, release the
load and then land. In the worst case, the rate of descent would be in the low hundreds of feet per minute
as compared with a thousand or more feet per minute in a single-engine helicopter with its engine out.
The FARs require multi-engine helicopters for most civilian SAR missions. "The use of SAR modes in civil
operations requires special airworthiness standards (special conditions) to ensure . . . a level of safety
consistent with Category A and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) . . . ." 77 Fed.Reg. 60883 (Oct. 5, 2012)
(imposing autopilot requirements on EC225LP helicopters). 14 C.F.R. § 133.45(e)(1) prohibits Class D
operations 14 C.F.R. Part 27 (for rotorcraft with gross weights less than 7,000 pounds) and 14 C.F.R. Part
29 for "transport category rotorcraft" impose special airworthiness requirements for Class D operations.
Part 27 allows only multiengine rotorcraft meeting the requirements of Appendix C to Part 127 to be type
certified. 14 C.F.R. § 27.1(c). Appendix C incorporates Category A requirements. "Category A, with
respect to transport category rotorcraft, means multiengine rotorcraft designed with engine and system
isolation features specified in Part 29 and utilizing scheduled takeoff and landing operations under a
critical engine failure concept which assures adequate designated surface area and adequate performance
capability for continued safe flight in the event of engine failure." 14 C.F.R. § 1.1(2).
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pilot would be hard pressed to do this without injury to the load or the crew, probably
both.51
Search and rescue missions involving HEL require not only higher level of proficiency;
they also require a larger helicopter and larger team. The frequency of HEL operations
is low for any particular agency. The best coverage for the range of public safety
missions results from larger fleets of smaller helicopters, with smaller numbers of SAR
helicopters available on a more-widely shared basis.
5.
Limitations on flight profiles
For any of these mission types, helicopters have limitations. They are not likely to be
helpful, for example, when activities of concern are certain to take place entirely inside
structures, and thus are not visible from the air. Even if an incident begins inside a
structure, however, the possibility always exists that a person of interest may exit the
structure. It may be useful to have helicopter assets in the air to detect such an exit.
It also is problematic for helicopters to hover 50-100 feet above the ground—a posture
often seen in action movies and video games. In any helicopter operation, the most
urgent emergency is an engine failure. Aircraft engines rarely fail in flight—when was
the last time your automobile engine suddenly quit while you were driving on an
expressway? When they do quit, the pilot must immediately establish an
“autorotation,” a flight regime in which the rotor spins and continues to generate lift
because it is being driven by an upflow of air as the helicopter descends rather than by

In a human external load operation, the pilot of a single-engine helicopter experiencing an engine
failure would have little choice: he would have to establish an autorotation as soon as possible and then
perform a two-stage flare maneuver. The pilot would immediately lower the collective to enter an
autorotation. As the helicopter begins to descend, he would immediately enter a flare to slow down. At
this point, the helicopter is travelling about 60 knots horizontally, and 20 knots vertically (1500-1800 feet
per minute). As the helicopter decelerates and the load gets closer to the ground, he would flare more
aggressively. He must take into account the fact that the load will swing forward with more aggressive
deceleration, increasing its distance from the helicopter as the line extends. He would hold the flair until
he judged that the ground speed was low enough for the human load to tolerate touching the ground at
that speed. He would release the load as soon as he judged that the load had reached the ground, and
immediately drop the nose to pick up more air speed. He cannot drop the nose too aggressively or rotor
RPM will decay so much that the rotor blades stall. He would then enter another flare to exchange the
remaining airspeed for rotor RPM, and then use the remaining RPM to cushion his landing as much as
possible. The best he could hope for would be a survivable crash for the aircrew and survivable impact
between the load and the ground.
51
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the engine. At heights of 500 feet or less above the ground, the pilot about 30 seconds to
establish the autorotation, select a safe landing spot within a very small glide range,
maneuver the helicopter to it, and to cushion the landing as best he can.
Heights below 500 feet and speeds of less than 60 knots make it difficult for even the
most skilled pilot to perform a successful rotation even if he practices them regularly.
The challenge is complicated in urban areas, where landing spots free of powerlines,
other obstacles, and people are few and far between.52
These flight profile limitations, however, do not negate the fact that helicopters are
extremely helpful in various helicopter support scenarios, and their inefficient use is
evident across many spectrums. One law enforcement scenario where their capability
was not fully utilized was in Watertown, Massachusetts.
6.
Watertown, MA: a case study
Anyone who has seen the video of the apprehension of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev after the
Boston Marathon attacks53 can appreciate how essential the Massachusetts State Police
helicopter and its infrared imaging was in obtaining a successful outcome--without
injury to law-enforcement personnel and with non-fatal injuries to the suspect. It is not
clear why helicopters were not involved earlier in coordinating the law-enforcement
response to the confrontation that occurred in Watertown after Dzhokhar and his
brother Tamerlan killed an MIT policeman and carjacked a Mercedes-Benz SUV. Video
and witness accounts used in reconstructing the scene afterwards show great
confusion.54 Had a helicopter been involved in the law-enforcement response, Dzhokhar
might not have escaped, and Tamerlan might not have been killed. In any event, the

See FAA, Helicopter Instructor’s Handbook figure 8-2 at p.8-4 (FAA-H-8083-4 2012) (showing
hazardous area below 60 knots and 500 feet, determined by test pilot’s ability to establish autorotation);
FAA Helicopter Flying Handbook figure 11-3 at p. 11-8 (FAA-H-8083-21A 2012) (same).
53 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YkzvMf3tigw (vid of boat taken from helicopter equipped with
night-vision equipment).
54 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NI0F5rm37-w (showing video of Watertown confrontation);
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_pQXcqA6Ag (news broadcast about the confrontation). Even
though the news footage in the YouTube video shows a helicopter in flight, the helicopter shot is in the
daytime, while the Watertown confrontation occurred at night.
52
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scene would have been illuminated by high-power helicopter-mounted searchlights
and spotlights.55
In considering the possibility of earlier helicopter support, one must make some
assumptions about when a helicopter would have been available. The Massachusetts
State Police has five turbine-powered helicopters, primarily twin-engine Eurocopter AS355Ns equipped with FLIR cameras, GPS synchronized mapping, interoperable
communications equipment, and digital video downlink systems. The helicopters are
based in Lawrence, Plymouth, and Westover.56 During the search for the Tsarnev
brothers, it would have been reasonable to keep one or more of the helicopters airborne.
If they were on the ground, ready to launch, one must make assumptions as to when
they would have been called out.
The murder of the MIT police officer might have triggered an opportunity for helicopter
support, although the initial reports regarding the murder were quite confused. There
was a crime scene to which the helicopter could have begun to lay out a pattern of
surveillance. But it was not immediately clear that the Tsarnaev brothers were
responsible. The initial carjacking of the Mercedes did not generate an opportunity for
helicopter support because no one knew about it until the owner of the Mercedes
escaped and called the police.
After that, however, the need for helicopter support was obvious. The authorities had a
precise description of the car, and they knew the precise location for beginning a search.
The ground scene was chaotic. Watertown had only five or six officers on duty, so the
Boston Police and the Massachusetts State Police took control of the search. “[A]ctually
trying to get control of the number of people, the mass of people that showed up,
proved to be a challenge for the people who were trying to organize that event." 57
Law enforcement from outside of Watertown — about 2,000 altogether — had trouble
navigating the neighborhood, a labyrinth of winding streets. They got lost. "They had

find video showing helicopter using high intensity spot and search lights and CITE
State Police Airwing Section, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/home-sec-emergresp/response/etrt/airwing.html
57 Phillip Martin, et al, Watertown Manhunt For Tsarnaevs Offers Lessons For Law Enforcement (Oct. 18,
2013), http://wgbhnews.org/post/watertown-manhunt-tsarnaevs-offers-lessons-law-enforcement.
55

56
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no idea where Dexter or Laurel Ave was and they had trouble finding us,” Watertown
Police Chief Ed Deveau said.
The Lawrence airport is 19.4 nautical miles from Watertown. Assuming aircrew was at
the Lawrence airport, and that the helicopter had been postflighted and was ready to
go, it could have been overhead Watertown ten-to-fifteen minutes from being called
out.58 If it were already airborne, as would have been reasonable in the aftermath of the
bombing, it could have been there much more quickly.
Even if there were no incident commander yet designated and no command post, the
helicopter aircrew, using its FLIR camera, could have helped ground units navigate the
dark streets through which Dzhokhar was fleeting.
[insert map]
The first contact with the brothers was when the carjack victim called 911—point A on
the map. The first step for the helicopter aircrew would be to check nearby interchanges
with limited access highways—if they were not already roadblocked. One familiar with
the area would pinpoint the entry ramps to I-95 in Charlestown, and entry ramps to the
Mass. Pike at Western Avenue. Quick dispatch of ground units to cover these escape
chokepoints would relieve the helicopter of trying to monitor multiple exit points. Such
assignment of ground units would depend on the availablility of realtime data about
their location from software such as Spidertracks,59 integrated with the geospatial
mapping software operating on the video displays in the helicopter. Map imagery
available from software such as Churchill would facilitate identifying the likely exit
points.
Once the long-distance escape routes were identified and monitored, the outlines of a
perimeter would be obvious, relieving the helicopter to search inside the perimeter. If
that did not turn up anything, the subjects might be fleeing along other routes, or they
might be hiding. That suggests, first, checking other likely exit routes, and, then,
checking densely populated neighborhoods and areas of dense foliage that might
conceal a vehicle.

58
59

It takes 14.5 minutes to fly 19.4 nautical miles at 80 knots.
http://us.spidertracks.com/.
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The helicopter would come inside the implied perimeter and work up and down with
its FLIR system according to a grid, from the outside in. Additionally, the noise of the
helicopter might have spooked the brothers, which would have aided the search. If the
brothers were hiding and ran when they heard the helicopter, it would have made them
easy to spot. If they were fleeing and sped up, it would have made them stand out as
well. A car on a freeway travelling even 10 miles per hour faster than the other traffic is
easy to distinguish.
Once the shootout was over and only Dhzarnov was on the run, the same strategy
would be adapted to this last point of contact—point B on the map.
Thus, the use of helicopter support earlier in the Watertown case could have greatly
assisted the ground patrol officers in capturing the Tsarnaev brothers.
The potential for helicopter support of public safety operations, in Watertown-like
scenarios and more broadly, depends on the particular resources available. That is the
subject of the next Part.

IV.

Resource requirements
A.

Aircraft

The types of helicopters involved in public safety support activities span a range from
relatively small helicopters such as the Robinson R44 to the UH-1 Huey. The following
table provides a comparison of the most popular types.
Type

Single engine:
Robinson R44
AStar AS350B2 or B3

Price

Useful
load
(pounds)

1,000
$700900,00061
2,270
$2

Cruise
speed
(knots)*

Direct
operating
cost per
hour 60

Fuel
consumption
gal per hour

113

$217

16

133-155

$736

4862

https://www.conklindd.com/CDALibrary/ACCostSummary.aspx
Robinson Helicopter Company price list,
http://www.robinsonheli.com/price_lists_eocs/r44_police_pricelist.pdf
62 Eurocopter, Technical Data at p37, http://www.eurocopter.com/site/docs_wsw/RUB_494/350B2-09-10102.pdf.
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MD500e
Bell Long Ranger L4
Twin engine:
EC135/145
AW139
Bell 212

million
$1.5
million
$1.2
million
$3.9
million
$10
million
$3.7
million#

1,519

135-155

$585

64

2,176

124-125

$722

40

3,296

137-140

$1094

61

5,8866,768
4,500

165-167

$2167

142

107-120

$1635

108

•

“fast cruise” and VNE

•

# Price for late model used; no longer sold new

An unfortunate tendency exists for public safety agencies to convince themselves that
they need larger and more complex helicopters than is actually the case. This drives up
costs, complicates insurance coverage limitations, and makes it more difficult to recruit
personnel. Two beliefs in this regard are worth evaluating.
A deeply embedded belief in the law-enforcement pilot community holds that smaller
helicopters do not have sufficient useful load for necessary equipment or necessary
performance capabilities. A parallel belief is that nothing less than a turbine helicopter
such as a Bell 407, an MD500, or an AS 350 is adequate for law-enforcement support.63
Neither belief is valid. As airborne surveillance and navigation technologies and
helicopter design have evolved, specialized police and ENG versions of the Robinson
R44 and R66 helicopters have the same equipment and have essentially the same
performance capabilities as those used by ENG operators and law enforcement agencies
flying AS350s. The Textron-Bell Bell SLS model, expected to be certificated by the FAA
in 2014, will provide another small-helicopter option.64 The SLS offers performance

Turbine power’s main advantages over reciprocating engine power are: greater power output for a
given engine weight and considerably simpler machinery.
63

See
http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en_US/Commercial/BellShortLightSingleSLS/119299142
2596.html#/?tab=highlights-tab.
64
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comparable to the Robinson R66, and Bell expects to price it competitively with the
R66.65
The argument is not that the R44 or the R66 has the same capabilities as an AS350; they
don’t. The chart shows that. Pilots with ENG experience in both prefer the AS350. The
point is that the smaller helicopters have capabilities adequate for police operations, at
much lower cost.
Furthermore, empirical studies call into question the validity of the belief that piston
engine helicopters are less reliable than turbine helicopters.66
Co-author Perritt has flown with law-enforcement agencies flying AS350s and with
agencies flying the Robinson R66. Flight crew activities, equipment, and flight profiles
were identical, with the differences in aircraft making no material difference in mission
performance.
The acquisition and operating costs of the smaller helicopters are dramatically lower.
Fontana acquired and maintains its fleet of three Robinson helicopters for less than the
$3.8 million that the Ontario, CA, police department just paid to purchase one equipped
AS 350B2.
To support law enforcement patrol functions, the search part of search and rescue, and
the surveillance part of disaster relief, a smaller helicopter such as the Robinson R44,
Robinson R66, Bell 206B3, or its military equipment the OH 58, is suitable. For rescue,
SWAT, and rescue operations, a larger helicopter is necessary, on the order of an AS350
on the lower end, or a UH-1 Huey on the higher end.
The higher costs of the larger helicopters means that their capability is more likely to be
available through acquisition of government-surplus helicopters than by purchasing the
open market.
On the other hand, the capabilities provided by the smaller helicopters represents a
more equal trade-off between market transactions and government donations, and
between purchase of new and used aircraft. A Robinson R66 has a basic price of

65
66

Compare id. with http://www.robinsonheli.com/rhc_r66_turbine.html.
Cite JPL study.
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$800,000. Used Bell 206B3s in reasonably good condition can be obtained for $600$800,000. The operating costs and performance of the Bells are not as attractive as those
of the Robinsons, so that the choice between them is basically a tossup. If an agency can
get an OH-58 through the Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services program,67
that would seem to be obviously preferable, but the costs associated with
reconditioning a surplus helicopter and with getting parts for an older version can
equalize the cost difference. Actual maintenance hours per flight hour are not likely to
vary much with age because of the nearly universal requirement that parts be replaced
as they reach service lives predefined by the manufacturer.68
Load carrying capability is important for disaster relief, EMS, and search and rescue,
depending on whether personnel extraction is likely to be part of a search and rescue
mission. It may not be when ground personnel are nearby in land searches. Personnel
extraction is central to EMS missions. Even if personal insertion or extraction is not part
of a disaster relief mission, helicopters are likely to be called upon to drop relief
supplies. On the other hand, load carrying capability is less important for lawenforcement support and fire suppression missions-- of the wildfire context.
Bigger helicopters have to be bigger than Jet Rangers, or MD500s; even AS350s have
obvious size limitations on those kinds of missions.
A belief also exists in some quarters that twin-engine helicopters are better. This is also
questionable, except for HEL operations.
In a twin-engine helicopter, the two engines are interconnected through a single
gearbox and control mechanisms to drive a single main and tail rotor. Their
interconnections are such that if one of engine fails, the pilot only notices a diminution
in the amount of power (torque) available to drive the rotor. This is quite different from
an engine failure in a single-engine helicopter, in which the pilot has no choice but to
initiate autorotation and land wherever he can within a radius of about a mile
(depending on altitude) within 60 seconds if the engine fails.

67

See § V.F (explaining source of Air-One helicopters).

68

See e.g. 14 C.F.R. § 33.70 (requiring operating limitations for life limited engine parts).
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Engine failures are quite rare, however. Safety can be improved more by having two
crew members than by operating only twin-engine helicopters.69

B.

Equipment

The equipment list for any particular helicopter should depend on the range of missions
is intended to fly.
Any conceivable public safety mission requires good geospatial mapping software and
appropriate radio communications. Most law-enforcement missions also require a highintensity searchlight. Video and infrared imaging also enhances most missions. Search
and rescue missions require some of the same equipment as law-enforcement support:
good imaging capability and good geospatial referencing systems.
1.
VHF and UHF radios capable of communicating on public-safetyagency frequencies
Appropriate radio communication is essential for effective coordination of helicopter
operations with ground forces and vehicles. There must be agreement at the outset of a
mission as to what frequencies will be used for command-and-control and, when
appropriate, for more direct communication with ground forces. Typically more than
one frequency will be required.70 Frequencies must be available, not only in vehicles
such a squad cars, they must be available on portable handsets, as well. Often, in a
tactical operation, the most important coordination occurs between airborne assets and
individual personnel on foot in the field.
Air-One, like LAPD, the El Monte Police Department, and the Fontana Police
Department, has the capability to operate on several hundred public safety frequencies.
and the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (“LEAS”)71 has worked with IEMA and
local agencies to establish common frequencies for tactical communication involving
resources from multiple agencies.72 IEMA has published an Illinois Tactical
Interoperability Field Operations Guide (2012), which provides detailed lists of
common frequencies, and establishes procedures for coordinating communications.73

69
70
71
72
73

10 December 2013 conversation between co-author Perritt and Kevin Sprague.
See Tactical Primer at 49 (explaining need for tactical, command, and logistics radio channels).
See 30 ILCS 105/6z-91 (establishing Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System fund)
CITE
See http://www.state.il.us/iema/SCIP/IIFOG-2012-corrected.pdf
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The Illinois State Police maintains an emergency radio network for inter-agency law
enforcement communication.74
Everyone must use a common language to communicate with each other with respect to
movements and location.75
2.
Geospatial mapping software
As Jack Schonely puts it, “Always know where you are.” (And communicate it clearly
to the air unit).76 A means for referencing places and objects on the ground is essential if
air and ground assets are to complement each other. The SAR community has
developed methods based on map grids77
But for this to work effectively, ground units also must know their positions. Basic GPS
capability is an efficient way to achieve this. Then, helicopter aircrew and ground forces
can communicate by references to street names and compass directions.78
Sophisticated proprietary hardware and software exists for public safety missions. It is
increasingly questionable, however, as GPS-based products improve, whether systems
costing in the hundreds of thousands of dollars are necessary.
The Churchill 37 FLIR Star Safire product illustrates the high end of the market. It
shows latitude, longitude, elevation and range at the top of the display screen, the exact
address at which the camera is pointed at the bottom of the screen, and superimposes
street names and numerical street addresses over the live full-screen image.79 The
operator can select ground features to be displayed or suppressed, such as school and
business names. The usual capability to zoom in and out is preserved, and the operator
can trigger an inset with a zoomed image superimposed over a larger zoomed out
image. A graphical image of the helicopter's heading and orientation and the camera

Illinois State Police Radio Network ("ISPERN"), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directivesmobile/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8ff7-45100ca39f167dfe.html?ownapi=1.
75 Tactical Primer at 45 (stressing essentiality of common terminology and procedures)
76 Schonely at 42
77 See § XXX.
78 CITE
79 http://www.churchillnavigation.com/media/vid/37-flir-star-safire. Camera azimuth and elevation are
shown at the bottom of the screen.
74
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elevation can be shown in a corner of the screen.80 The operator can enter an address on
the touchscreen and cause the camera to slew to the targeted address.81
Augmented Reality Mapping System ("ARS") gives the operator access to the physical
camera mounted to the helicopter and a virtual camera linked to geospatial data. The
operator can link the images generated by the two cameras, or he can select and zoom
them independently.82
At the low end of the market, commonly available aviation navigation systems costing a
few hundred dollars or less superimpose maps, e.g. from Google maps, on aeronautical
charts, and show the position of the aircraft on map displays as the helicopter moves
around.83 A variety of grids exist for ground-based84 and aerial searches. ForeFlight,85
the market leader in aviation cockpit navigation systems for iPads and other tablet
computers, offers built-in search-and-rescue grids. It offers seven different search
patterns86 that can be overlaid on regular aviation charts and ground maps.87 The
Aerocomputer software on the LAPD helicopter causes the display to show the
distance, the magnetic track to the target, the ETE, and the ETA.
LAPD, Fontana, and Chicago personnel take their iPads with them and refer to
geospatial software and images on the iPad as often as they do the more sophisticated
Aerocomputers system installed on the helicopter.88

Id.
http://www.churchillnavigation.com/media/vid/26-touchscreen-in-operation.
82
See http://www.churchillnavigation.com/products/ars.
83 See Pilot's Guide to ForeFlight Mobile, http://cloudfront.foreflight.com/pilots-guide-to-foreflightmobile-4.4.pdf, at 21 (showing how use can select street map or aviation chart for display).
84 See http://kyem.ky.gov/teams/Documents/SAR%20Field%20Search%20Methods.pdf (Kentucky
government document explaining grids, search methods, and terminology) [hereinafter “Kentucky
Guide”].
85 www.foreflight.com.
86 Grid-aligned, circle, creeping line, expanding square, parallel, route search, and sector.
http://blog.foreflight.com/2013/09/17/foreflight-adds-annotations-comprehensive-search-rescuefunctionality/.
87 http://blog.foreflight.com/2013/09/17/foreflight-adds-annotations-comprehensive-search-rescuefunctionality/.
88 See, e.g. Aerocomputers' UC-5100 systems designed for law-enforcement, other public safety, and
military applications. http://aerocomputers.com/products/ultichart/
80
81
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The TFO wore an iPad mini strapped to his thigh. He referred to GoogleMaps on it
periodically. The TFOs said that they found Google maps easier to use than the
Aerocomputer mapping software, although Aerocomputer’s computation of track to the
target, ETA and ETE were occasionally useful.
The need for sophisticated geospatial software and grid construction should not be
exaggerated. In most cases, the following kind of exchange between your ground forces
and aircrew is sufficient:
"Where did you last see him?"89
"He ran into the parking lot behind the Jack-in-the-Box
The pilot and TFO confer. The pilot slows to a hover briefly as they try to spot the Jack-in-theBox take-out restaurant.
"We see it. We're checking the back."
No special equipment preplanning is necessary; only commonsense identification of
landmarks and an aircrew whose attention is directed outside the helicopter.
On the other hand, moving map displays with street addresses is of considerable
assistance in finding the location of an assignment initially.
3.
High intensity searchlight
Helicopter law enforcement patrols depend on high intensity searchlights at night.
NightSun90 is so common that it is used as a generic term.
In the Fontana vehicle search, the helicopter first orbited in the vicinity of the holdup,
looking for the car. Not finding it, the aircrew concluded that the car had gotten on the
freeway. The helicopter then searched the nearby freeways, using visual inspection
outside the aircraft, aided by the NightSun searchlight, and binoculars. The FLIR was
on, but was not particularly useful, because what mattered was not heat signature but
visual characteristics of the target.

This exchange is adapted from actual radio and intercom conversations during co-author Perritt’s
helicopter patrol with LAPD.
90 See http://www.spectrolab.com/searchlights/
89
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4.
High-resolution color and infrared cameras, gimbled, and
attached to the nose of the helicopter
Most public-safety helicopters, like ENG helicopters, are equipped with sophisticated
imaging systems comprising both color video and infrared capability. Such equipment
is useful in a variety of missions, but it is not necessary all the time.
The FLIR UltraMedia HD91 is an example of a system in common use for public safety
and electronic-news-gathering helicopters.92 It permits an operator on the helicopter to
zoom and pan the camera while watching the image captured by the camera on a highresolution video monitor.93 Typically, the TFO uses the monitor to examine detail not
discernible to his naked eye, or to get the enhanced images available from infrared heat
signatures of vehicles and individuals. Standard FLIR video displays allow split screen
presentation, with a map on one side of the screen, and either the infrared or color
video image on the other. Alternatively, the infrared image can appear on one side and
the color video image on the other.
Disagreement exists on how much airborne patrol TFOs should rely on imagery
technology as compared with looking out the window.94 Means overemphasizes use of
infrared imaging, however, and underrates the value of unaided visual reference
The FLIR UltraMedia HD is an imaging gyrostabilizer that houses a Sony 1500 digital camera system
capable of a 1040mm zoom.
92 The photographic equipment in public safety helicopters is quite similar to that installed in ENG
Helicopters, with two significant differences: newsgatherers are less likely to be interested in infrared
images, while law-enforcement is likely to find infrared imagery more useful than color images in many
cases; pristine image quality is important for newsgathering, so it can be broadcast with the same
aesthetic levels as viewers are accustomed to in the regular programming; that level of quality is less
important for public safety operations. What matters for public safety operations is resolution and level of
detail, not so much lighting and color balance. Conversation with Erich Schmid, 10 November 2013.
93 When ground commanders want to see live imagery, an appropriate microwave link must be
91

established from the helicopter to the ground. To enable this, the helicopter this must be equipped with
an appropriate antenna system capable of locking onto a downlink frequency and automatically tracking
the ground station antenna regardless of helicopter position or orientation. The Troll Skylink HD system
is an example of what is available. See http://www.trollsystems.com/index.php/antenna-design2/airborne-antennas/skylink-hd-directional-antennas. Although ENG almost always involves downlink,
it is rarely used in law-enforcement, even when the helicopter is equipped with the capability.
Among other things, the temperatures in San Diego make FLIR more useful, because hotter objects like
human beings stand out more clearly from the background. This is less true when ambient temperatures
are higher, as in Los Angeles. Discussion with LAPD pilot and TFO, 29 Dec. 2013.
94
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outside, searchlights for night operations, and low flight heights—on the order of 300500 feet AGL. The airborne patrol missions in Los Angeles and Fontana showed the
superiority of outside observation with the naked eye instead of relegating the aircrew
to being mere camera operators.
What was important in both the LAPD and Fontana missions was skilled human
observation of the ground with the naked eye aided occasionally by binoculars and
searchlight. The FLIR added nothing. For most of the LAPD flight, the TFO monitored
the moving map display, into which he easily entered a particular address.
Infrared imagery was used more as a backup than for primary reference. It was
obvious, flying in the LAPD and Fontana patrol helicopters, that inspection with the
unaided eye out the TFO’s side window95 was superior to the perspective available if
the TFO had fixed his attention only on the display.
As in the LAPD operation’s roof inspection, there was no need for infrared imagery; it
was obvious from the search-light illuminated roof in LA whether anyone was on the
roofs that were inspected, and the SUV was obvious in traffic, with or without the
searchlight.

C.

Personnel

All public safety support operations require at least two skilled members in the aircrew:
a pilot, and a Tactical Flight Officer (“TFO”). The pilot’s job is to fly the helicopter
safely; this preempts any other duties he may undertake to support the mission. He
must be capable of understanding instructions provided to him by the TFO and
translating them promptly into flight maneuvers, while at the same time exercising
judgment as to when a request would be unsafe to execute.
The TFO must understand the capabilities and limitations of the helicopter so that he
does not give instructions to the pilot that would result in unsafe operations.
1.

Aircrew

The minimum aircrew comprises a pilot and a TFO. The pilot flies the helicopter; he
must be able to go where he is told by the TFO and incident commanders and to fly

The specially modified door on the port side of the helicopter has a floor-to-ceiling window for its full
width.
95
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flight profiles that will be effective in accomplishing a particular task. In doing these
things, he must be able to exercise judgment as to what is safe and what is not. He must
be attentive to his altitude, airspeed, and rotor RPM. He must look out for other traffic,
likely to be a particular problem because public safety incidents requiring helicopter
support are also likely to draw ENG helicopters. The pilot also is responsible for
communicating with FAA air traffic control, which may be more or less burdensome
depending on whether the mission takes the helicopter into congested and controlled
airspace.
The pilot is going to be busy enough with these essential tasks that distractions by what
is happening on the ground, where the camera is pointed, and communications with
ground personnel would crowd his bandwidth.
That's why the TFO is essential as a second crewmember; observes the ground, cross
checks the moving map display, handles radio calls with ground units and suggests
directions of flight to the pilot. He is primarily responsible for operating the camera and
the searchlight. There is no question that having street-cop skills in the cockpit is
necessary to do the job well. Geographic knowledge of the patrol area, knowledge of
what constitutes suspicious activity, experience with how someone might flee or hide,
and the likely behavior of responding officers is essential.
For the most part, the TFO makes the decision about where to go, but sometimes the
pilot says, "Do you think we ought to go check that out?" He and the pilot communicate
over the aircraft intercom and do not need many words to fly the mission in the right
way. Both are likely to have access to the same moving map display, either on separate
video displays or one they both can see. The TFO may say, "they want us to leave Sector
A and go over head the southwest corner of sector B," or, "they want us to orbit the
McDonald's,” or, " fly a heading of 300° and drop-down a hundred feet." Intercrew
communications in Los Angeles and Fontana were succinct. As with any two-member
aircraft crew, the two members assisted each other in targets on the ground: "see that
high school football field. It's just to the north and a bit west of that, the house with the
solar cells on the roof in the swimming pool of the backyard." “Slow down at this off
ramp." “Right pedal,” from the TFO when he wanted the Helicopters slewed so that he
could get a better view out the side window with binoculars. Once or twice, "can you
come down a little bit?" when the TFO needed a closer view available from the lower
height. In general, throughout this part of the mission, the helicopter remained at 500 to
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600 feet AGL at a speed matching that of the traffic on the freeway. At one point, the
pilot told the TFO that he was climbing a few hundred feet to remain well above some
electric transmission line towers that were hard to see in the dark.
The distinction between the roles of pilot and TFO does not mean, however, that they
do not constantly back each other up; the TFO is constantly helping with navigation
anyway. He must be aware of the basic capabilities and limitations of the helicopter. He
should supplement the pilot’s lookout for other traffic. Similarly, the pilot must
understand the mission tasks and be able to make competent suggestions about where
and how to fly best to support them.
A larger crew is necessary for load operations, especially those involving personnel
insertion or extraction. Pilots must be able to fly precise altitudes and speeds and
control the helicopter so that the load does not swing. The pilot also must be able to
follow intercom instructions immediately and precisely. Especially in a single-engine
helicopter, the pilot must have a strategy for managing the extremely demanding
situation that would result from an engine failure.
TFOs for load operations also must have carefully honed and frequently practiced skill
sets, involving monitoring the load, immediately translating their observations into
commands to the pilot giving interpreting hand signals, and securing load lines, tethers,
and personnel vests securely.
Other crew members for load operations include a copilot to reduce pilot workload and
additional crewmembers in the back to monitor the load and relay signals to the
through the crew chief or directly to the pilot. Rescue personnel, who may themselves
become human loads, also may be necessary.
Recruitment and training of pilots and TFOs are considered in § ___.
2.

Training of TFOs and ground personnel

Public safety agencies must have an appreciation of when and how helicopter assets can
be helpful. Air-One’s current training program96 is a good model.

Co-authors Perritt and Cue participated in TFO and GSO training on 20 November 2013, involving
personnel insertion and extraction via human load operations. See § III.4. Co-author Perritt participated
96
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Participants in the Air-One training session included some 25 officers from northern
Illinois police departments, including several from NIPAS and its Emergency Services
Team and Mobile Field Force,97 and the Illinois State Police. A representative from the
FBI also participated.
The training session began with a two-hour PowerPoint presentation covering basic
helicopter operations, helicopter safety and survival98 and:
•

Tactical team mobilization

•

Insertion of personnel through hover step-off, hoist, rapeling, and spy rigging.99

•

Rapid extraction of injured persons

•

Tactical emergency medical operations

•

Unstable platform sniper

•

Logistical support via cargo haul

•

FLIR and Night Sun

•

K-9 support100

Safety was emphasized as the paramount value. Air-One never launches without the
final signoff by its Safety Officer.
The session included an overview of procedures for mission coordination, including
availability of suitable electronic or paper maps, communications plans and
frequencies, designation of one mission coordinator for ground forces.

in an indoor training activity on 10 December. 2013. The details presented in this subsection are based on
that participation.
97 See § V.C
98 The presentation included guidance on how on-board personnel can position themselves to minimize
injury in the event of a crash resulting from an engine failure or loss of tail rotor control. The presenters
noted that, although two Air-One Huey helicopters are equipped for long line operations, the
organization prefers its twin-engine UH-1N to its single-engine UH-1V helicopter for human-external
load operations and training.
99 The FBI cautioned against use of or training on fast-rope operations, because of its risks. Long-line and
short-line human-load operations can meet almost all of the needs addressed by fast-rope operations at
less risk.
100 A number of K-9 dogs have flown in Air-One training missions. They usually exited the helicopter
with their tails wagging. Careful preparation is necessary, however, to prepare the dogs for the noise and
movement of the helicopter.
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The training included basic practical tips such as “avoid the tail rotor,” and “don’t shoot
through the rotor discs,” and reviewed common errors such as tensing up when the
helicopter banks thereby increasing the risk of sliding free of restraints and falling out
of the helicopter, losing situational awareness and thus knowledge of where a victim is
when the helicopter lands, and various sources of distraction such as the “the lights and
siren are so cool!” syndrome, remembered by every law enforcement officer from the
first time he participated in an emergency response in a squad car.
Static drills in the Air-One helicopters followed, with the officers armed and dressed in
their tactical gear. The purpose of the exercises was to build muscle memory on basic
procedures and to make safety and effective deployment instinctive.
Although this particular training activity obviously was aimed at larger scale
operations, its basic coverage of helicopter safety and capabilities and coordination
between ground personnel and aircrews is appropriate for a broad spectrum of public
safety personnel. Two components of a training initiative are appropriate, one aimed at
current personnel, the other aimed at new officers. A similar training segment also
should be added to police academy curricula so that all law-enforcement officers
appreciate how helicopters complement conventional forces in various kinds of tactical
situations.
The theme of the article is that helicopter support for public safety operations can be
available more widely if mechanisms exist for sharing. That is true of aircraft,
equipment installed on them, personnel, and training. The next Part considers
organizations structures the law makes available for sharing.

V.

Organizational alternatives

The thesis of this article is that more communities could benefit from helicopter support
of public safety operations if helicopters were shared among multiple agencies. A
variety of ways exist to accomplish such sharing. One agency may own air assets and
enter into agreements with other agencies; multiple agencies may contract with a single
private operator; a separate organization like Air-One can be established as a kind of
mutual aid pact. Or, the Civil Air Patrol can be adapted to cover all or part of the need.
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A.

Owning and contracting

Public safety agencies can get access to helicopter support in four basic ways: they can
buy101 one or more new helicopters; they can buy one or more used helicopters; they can
obtain surplus government helicopters through the Defense Logistics Agency
program;102 or they can contract for services from a private operator.
With any of these options, the agency may unbundle the responsibility for keeping the
helicopter well-maintained, safe and for flying it effectively. For example, it could own
the helicopter and contract with a private operator for maintenance; it could own the
helicopter and contract with a private operator for pilots and TFOs; or it could do
everything itself.
Much, but not all, of the choice among the four options ordinarily is driven by cost: if
contracting costs less than owning a helicopter, it is an attractive option.
As important as cost, however, especially in the law-enforcement community, is culture
and experience. As § VI.C.3 explains, it is far easier for a TFO who has significant onthe-ground law enforcement experience to do a good job flying a mission and
coordinating with ground forces. That also may be true of the pilot, but less so. Not only
does an experienced law-enforcement officer instinctively know how to provide good
support; ground personnel are more likely to trust him.
Public-safety organization with sufficient budgets can buy one or more helicopters and
perform all operational functions themselves. Examples are the Los Angeles Police
Department, the Chicago Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 103 the
Maryland State Police, 104 and the California Highway Patrol,105 and some smaller

101 Leasing is another possibility, but this section does not consider leasing separately because a lease can
be structure to be almost indistinguishable from a purchase, such as a 20-year dry lease for a helicopter
alone, without associated services. Or it can be structured to be almost indistinguishable from the
contract for services, say a six-month lease for a helicopter with crew and maintenance support.
102 See § V.F
103 http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/surveillance-and-aviation
104https://www.mdsp.org/Organization/SpecialOperationsBureau/AviationCommand/TheCommand.aspx
105 http://www.chp.ca.gov/depts_divs_offs/airops.html
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departments such as the El Monte, and Fontana, California, police departments. But
most agencies cannot afford to own helicopters.106
Nor is it easy for them to contract for helicopter support. Some functions are so
specialized that public-safety departments are unlikely to find the requisite capability in
the marketplace. Economies of scale107 that might exist for flight activities such as rides
and tours, executive charter, and flight training, do not exist as between these activities
and law-enforcement support. A fair amount of specialized equipment is necessary for
effective law-enforcement support. Installation of such equipment in a helicopter makes
it less suitable for the other flight activities that most local operators want to use their
helicopters for.
Moreover, a private operator is less likely to have access to a labor market from which
the most desirable TFOs and pilots should be recruited. A law-enforcement agency that
organizes helicopter support internally has more options for integrating the helicopter
support with its regular law enforcement activities.
On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that a national, more specialized operator
might emerge. Such an operator would have a better understanding of best practices
and good examples from other jurisdictions and could have a pool of seasoned TFOs
and pilots who have the requisite law enforcement experience and have worked in
similar functions elsewhere. The reason may have less to do with economics, considered
more broadly in § V.B, than with law-enforcement culture that is skeptical of
commercial operators’ capacity to understand public-safety, particularly lawenforcement, needs.
Fontana, California, provides an example of the internalization of a helicopter support
operation formerly performed by a contractor.

In 2007, the United States had some 13,000 local police departments, 3,000 sheriffs' offices with primary
law enforcement jurisdiction, and 49 state police agencies. DOJ Sheriff Statistics at p.6 (Table 1). Only
seven percent of sheriffs' offices used aviation assets, although the number rose to 59% for offices serving
populations of one million or more, and 41% for populations of 500,000 to one million. The percent drops
to twelve percent and continues to decline in proportion to size for populations of 250,000 or less. DOJ
Sheriff Statistics at p.10 (Table 21). Those using aviation assets use helicopters more than fixed-wing
aircraft. DOJ Sheriff Statistics at p.13 (Table 26).
107 § V.B explains economies of scale and scope.
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Fontana contracted with a private operator to fly dedicated helicopter support for
Fontana with one R44. The private operator was owned by an airline pilot who
managed the operation remotely. It flew with part-time pilot, each one assigned a day
of the week. Over time, the contract operation was increasingly unsatisfactory, largely
manifested in poor housekeeping of hanger space and of the helicopters, although no
threats to safety were evident. The problem seemed to be that no one involved with the
private operator had sufficient personal involvement in the operation to take any real
pride.
Faulker had unsuccessfully lobbied two previous chiefs to make a change in the private
operator. He finally went to the third chief, himself an airplane pilot, and said, "We're
paying $500,000 a year to the private operator. Make the $500,000 available to me, and
I'll show you that we can set up our own operation, and that it will meet our needs
much better.
The chief, with some trepidation, agreed, and allowed Faulkner to sell the idea to the
city council. After he gained approval, Faulker shopped aggressively for used R44s; he
knew that he could not set up operation with his $500,000 and use a larger helicopter.
He was familiar with the R44 capabilities from his flying with El Monte, and the city
was familiar with the aircraft because of this relationship with the contract operator.
He found an R44-law enforcement version with only 140 hours on it that had been
bought by an Australian agency that had never flown it on a mission because of local
personnel hostility to Robinson helicopters. It was sitting at the Long Beach airport, not
flying. He made a deal for it, and put another $100,000 into refurbishing it and adding
appropriate radio equipment
The aircraft flew some 1300 hours in its first year of operation and was down for
maintenance for only three days of promised availability. During the first year, the air
support unit was under-budget.
Now, the Department flies the R44, an R66 turbine model, and has another R66 on
order. Section VI.D recounts Faulkner’s leadership.
B.

Market structure and contract operators

Whether public-safety contract services are available depends on the market structure
of the helicopter industry. The structure of the helicopter industry, as for any industry,
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is determined by economies of scale,108 economies of scope,109 and economic barriers to
entry.110 These are not entirely independent concepts. If one market can be served
effectively only with a $3 million helicopter, the cost of that asset represents a barrier to
entry. Its cost also suggests economies of scale. If the market supports only ten flight
hours per month, and the helicopter is too specialized to be useful in other market
segments, the rate of return will be far too low to justify investment. On the other hand,
if the market supports one hundred flight hours per month, the investment can be
justified.111 The larger scale of the hundred-hour market drives the economics into
positive territory.
Whether economies of scale can be captured by an enterprise is a question different
from whether they exist. An operator might have a helicopter that needs one-hundred
flight hours per month to break even, but lack the number of pilots needed to fly it that
much, or lack the marketing capacity to pull in that many customers. Another firm with
the same helicopter, more marketing muscle, and a more robust stable of pilots could
realize the economies of scale.

Economies of scale exist when a larger seller is more efficient than a smaller seller because of its size.
When economies of scale exist in an industry, one expects to see consolidation: fewer, larger sellers,
reflecting concentration. When economies of scale do not exist or if diseconomies of scale exist, one
expects to see more, smaller operators, reflecting fragmentation.
109 Economies of scope exist when sellers with a wider range of products are more efficient than sellers
with a more limited range. Economies of scope exist when a seller can lower his per-unit costs by offering
more than one product line. For example if the seller of peanut butter also sells jelly and bread, its costs
per unit sold are lower than if it sells peanut butter alone. Peanut butter, jelly, bread are complementary
products, and are usually sold together. One sales call and one delivery trip can provide all three
products to retailers at the same cost for providing peanut butter alone. When economies of scope exist,
diversification is the norm. When economies of scope do not exist, specialization is the norm.
110 Barriers to entry can be direct and monetary in nature or they can be indirect and involve time or
psychological values. For example, a person might be choosing between earning a living as a newspaper
route deliveryman or starting up a helicopter service, say by buying a helicopter and offering rides and
tours. The barriers to entry are vastly different. If he chooses the aviation option, he has to buy or lease a
helicopter and get trained as a pilot, which requires both substantial time and substantial money. If he
chooses the newspaper delivery option the barriers to entry are close to zero, especially if he already has a
car.
111 Depending, of course, on what price per flight hour buyers are willing to pay.
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The industry structures of different segments of the helicopter services market illustrate
these economic considerations. EMS is dominated by large national operators112 Air
Methods113 has more than 400 Helicopters, deployed at some 300 operating bases. Most
of its helicopters serve more than one healthcare institution.114 Air Evac is only a little
smaller and performs a similar role.115 In some cases, EMS helicopters are shared
through a non-profit organized by healthcare providers.116 For example, CareFlite is a
Texas, nonprofit 501(c)(3) controlled by five Dallas-area hospital systems.117 CareFlite
responds to requests from hospitals, fire departments, EMS agencies and law
enforcement within a service area of more than 100 counties in a 150-mile radius of the
Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex.118
Some large regional or national operators serve the EMS market as well as other
markets. Large oil-and-gas operators, for example, also have a presence in the EMS
market. PHI, Inc.119 bills itself as the "total helicopter company," flying offshore oil and
gas, air medical, and onshore mining missions.120 Based in Lafayette, LA, it flies 165
helicopters for offshore oil and gas missions out of 45 PHI heliports around the world.121

Air Methods and Air Evac are dominant national operators. Hospital Wing is a non-profit air medical
transport partnership with local hospitals, in the vicinity of Memphis. https://www.hospitalwing.com/
(describing availability of seven helicopters--six Eurocopter Astar AS350B3's and one Eurocopter
EC130B4--to provides inter-hospital transfers as well as emergency scene calls within 150 mile radius of
Memphis, including West Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Alabama, and Kentucky).
113 http://www.airmethods.com/.
114 Air Methods, 2012 Annual Report, http://www.airmethods.com/airmethods/investors/financialreports/detail/2013/03/01/air-methods-2012-annual-report#.Uoja9vmkra1 [hereinafter “Air Methods 2012
Report”].
115 CITE
116 The FAA reports that there are 74 air ambulance companies that operate about 850 helicopters in the
United States. Fact Sheet – FAA Initiatives to Improve Helicopter Air Ambulance Safety,
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=11957 (Oct. 7, 2010).
117 Texas Health Resources (Harris Methodist, Presbyterian and Arlington Memorial Hospitals),
Methodist Health System, Baylor Health Care System, Parkland Health and Hospital System, and the JPS
Health Network.
118 http://www.careflite.org/AboutUs.aspx.
119 www.phihelico.com.
120 Id.
121 Id. It flies a fleet of Bell 206Ls, Bell 407s, AS350B2s, BK117s, EC-145s, EC135s, Bells 222s, Bell 430s, Bell
212s, Bell 412s, Sikorsky S-76As, AW 139s, and Sikorsky S-92s. Id. See also PHI Annual Report at 16
(detailing numbers of specific types).
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Oil and gas is its strategic focus.122 Era Helicopters, LLC 123 is a somewhat smaller
operator--170 helicopters--serving the offshore oil and gas transport, air medical
services, search and rescue operations (SAR), firefighting, flightseeing, and disaster
relief markets. Most of its revenue comes from oil and gas activities, with only seven
percent from air medical services.124
Helicopter ENG is another segment where concentration is high. U.S. helicopters, based
in North Carolina,125 and Helicopters, Inc., based in St. Louis, dominate this market.
Both provide full-service, turnkey, contracts to local stations. Although ENG
Helicopters typically are branded to one station, wearing the livery of that station,
resources are shared, in the sense that the contractor is responsible for recruiting,
training, and dispatching pilots and equipment operators and for maintaining the
helicopters.126
Industrial helicopter operations also are concentrated, although operators tend to be
regional rather than national. Haverfield127and Air 2128 are examples.
At the other end of the size spectrum, hundreds of air-taxi and flight-training operators
exist, typically having two or three helicopters.129 Most of these operators offer rides and
tours; executive-charter; and aerial photography.
This industry prompts two questions: (1) Why are some parts of the industry
fragmented while other parts are consolidated, and (2) Why do not public safety
agencies contract for helicopter support, like hospitals and television stations?

PHI, Inc. Annual Report at 2 (2012),
http://www.phihelico.com/docs/Investor%20Relations/2012/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf [hereinafter
"PHI Annual Report"].
123 http://www.erahelicopters.com/content; Era Helicopters, LLC, Annual Report (2012),
http://ir.stockpr.com/eragroupinc/annual-reports/content/0001525221-13-000046/0001525221-13000046.pdf [hereinafter "Era Annual Report"].
124 Era Annual Report at 37.
125 See http://www.ushelicoptersinc.com/
126 The pictures on the homepage of U.S. Helicopters website all are of helicopters painted with a local TV
station's logo.
127 http://www.haverfield.com/ (electric power lines).
128 http://air2.com/ (electric power lines)
129 Some, like Hillsboro Aviation, www.hillsboroaviation.com/; and Bristow Academy,
http://www.heli.com/, have much larger fleets.
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In a perfect market, users of helicopter services—including public safety agencies-would contract out—purchase the services in the marketplace—if it is more efficient to
do so than to perform the services internally.
Several factors inhibit contracting with private operators for public safety helicopter
support. Diseconomies of scope discourage operators from seeking to penetrate this
market. A small commercial operator does not need a FLIR camera, a searchlight, or
radio communications on public safety frequencies to conduct its rides-and-tours and
executive charter business. It does not need tactical flight officers. It could, of course,
invest in these additional items of physical and human capital, but it is not clear that it
would achieve advantages in the marketplace from doing so. The equipment and skills
useful for public safety support would go unutilized in its original line of business.
But that accounts for the absence only of the smaller operators. Why do not larger
national or regional EMS, industrial, ENG, or oil-and-gas operators have a piece of the
public-safety market? Why is a private-contract sharing model so robust for ENG and
EMS, and almost entirely absent for search and rescue, natural disaster, counterterrorism, and law-enforcement support? The economies of scale are substantial for all
of them. For example, Air Methods dispatches most of its community-based locations
and some hospital-based locations from a centralized dispatch facility in Omaha.130
Maintenance for a larger fleet can be organized more efficiently than for one or two
helicopters.
One answer is that the elasticity of demand in the healthcare, commercial broadcasting,
and oil-and-gas exploration is lower—customers find it easier to justify paying the full
cost of helicopter support. The debate over health care reform long has recognized that
price resistance is almost entirely absent in the market for healthcare services. Eighty
percent of Air Methods revenue involves fixed monthly fees and twenty percent hourly
flight fees, and does not depend on when or if customers are reimbursed by patients,
healthcare insurers, or the federal government.131 Indeed, most of the reforms over the
last twenty years have focused on trying to introduce incentives to control price and
quantity of services consumed.

130
131

Air Methods 2012 Report at 2.
Air Methods 2012 Report at 1.
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As with other medical services, when a healthcare provider decides that helicopter
transport is necessary to save a life or to avoid greater morbidity, he simply orders the
service, and it is provided, with reimbursement details to be worked out later. Similarly,
an ongoing ratings war drives the behavior of broadcasters. If one station in a market
flies helicopter to provide viewers with overhead photography of traffic congestion and
emergency incidents, every other station in the market is likely to follow suit.
These forces do not operate in the broader market for public safety support. Lawenforcement budgets are controlled at the local level where helicopters often are
perceived as an expensive toy and budgets are tight. A contract with even a small
operator is likely to cost an agency $500-700,000 per year. The agency can buy a
Robinson R44 for that, as the Fontana, CA, story, recounted in §§ V.A and VI.D shows.
There is less resistance, however, to devoting resources to homeland security and
natural disaster relief. Accordingly, to the extent that helicopter assets can be useful for
these purposes, it is more likely that support can be obtained for them.
This analysis of industry structure suggests that the market is unlikely to provide the
level of public safety helicopter support that would be optimal from a public interest
standpoint, and as § V.A observes, law-enforcement culture militates against
contracting out law-enforcement support services.

C.

ENG and Public Safety

Journalism and public safety have an uneasy relationship in a free society. On the hand,
both are attentive to threats to public safety: law enforcement, firefighters, emergency
preparedness agencies, and paramedics seek to reduce the threats; news gathering
organizations cover the threats and governmental responses. Public safety and ENG
helicopters often are overhead the same incidents.
Moreover, ENG helicopters are well-equipped for police support. Both use FLIR
cameras, downlink and uplink radio equipment, and sophisticated geospatial mapping
capability. ENG flight crews have quite similar capabilities to those of police helicopter
aircrews. Police and ENG helicopters often are interested in the same incidents.
Explicit sharing arrangements between police and ENG operators are unlikely,
however; too much mistrust exists between the media and law enforcement. Few lawenforcement agencies would be willing to share all of their video with news
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organizations. They are too worried about security of operations and potential liability.
ENG operators are flying to do a job (to gather news in video form for a TV broadcast)
for which they are getting paid. They are not getting paid to aid in public safety or assist
law enforcement helicopters. Sometimes in certain scenarios the station will relay
messages about a scene to law enforcement. But ENG operators are not likely go out of
the way to assist.
On the other hand, cooperation already exists. Both sides understand the need to share
the sky. ENG operators yield right of way to law enforcement helicopters, so law
enforcement does not establish a TFR that would impede helicopter news gathering. An
unwritten code exists between pilots and operators. If ENG operators are first on the
scene and a law enforcement helicopter comes in, the ENG helicopter will back off or
climb higher. Typically, law-enforcement helicopters need to fly lower than do properly
equipped ENG helicopters, which can use their zoom lenses to get the video they need.
The ENG pilot communicates with the police pilot—usually over a CTAF frequency—
and provides basic details about the scene and the ENG pilot’s intentions, and everyone
is happy. If ENG is second on the scene, the ENG pilot does not expect details from the
police pilot; he simply does what he does best: capture the moment without the help of
law enforcement. As long as the ENG pilot stays out of the way, there is no friction
between the two.
On occasion, cooperation is deeper. ENG helicopters have supplemented surveillance or
search, kept alert for a fleeing vehicle or suspect, plugged holes in a perimeter, or stayed
on station while the law enforcement helicopter refuels. Such assists are spontaneous.
The possibility of formalizing them is remote.
Certain sensitive missions, such as barricade situations, are endangered by
contemporaneous broadcasts of news imagery. Law enforcement agencies and ENG
operators could agree on a protocol for designating certain situations in which
broadcast would be delayed. In exchange, the public safety operator might provide
video imagery and recorded radio communications, after-the-fact, to news
organizations.
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D.

Mutual aid pacts

Given the small size of most municipalities, local units cooperate on many public-safety
matters. 132 Since the early 1970s local governments have explored mechanisms for
coordinating the resources and activities of local law enforcement, firefighting, public
health, public works, and private-sector actors.133
They often do so via a legal structure of long standing, known as a "mutual aid pact."
Mutual aid pacts, sometimes authorized by ordinance or statute, 134 sometimes
expressed in intergovernmental contracts, 135 and sometimes completely informal,
permit or obligate public safety agencies to come to one another's assistance upon
request. 136 Usually, the responding personnel work under the command of the
requesting agency.137 In larger incidents, the state police and the FBI may get involved
as well. 138
In Illinois for example, law enforcement agency interest in mutual aid agreements grew
after MABAS,139 a system for statewide mutual aid for fire, emergency medical services
(EMS) and associated special operational services,140 proved successful. Concretely, the
Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System requires member agencies to maintain data on
numbers of officers and supervisors, types and number of vehicles and specialty

See generally William C. Nicholson, Seeking Consensus on Homeland Security Standards: Adopting
the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, 12 Widener L. Rev. 491
(2006) [hereinafter "Nicholson"] (analyzing "incident management" initiative to deploy and coordinate
resources from multiple agencies).
133 Nicholson at 491. (describing early efforts in California relating to major wildland fires).
134 HHP CITE
135 ILEAS has published a standard mutual aid agreement on its website.
https://www.ileas.org/sites/default/files/main/Member%20Services/mutualaidagreement.pdf.
136 The Illinois agreement gives law enforcement agencies the option to respond to requests with
"personnel, equipment, facilities, or services," that are "available." Id. § 3.
137 "Law enforcement personnel from the aiding agencies shall report to and shall work under the
direction and supervision of the stricken agency," and are to be made available without reimbursement.
Illinois Agreeement § 3.
138 Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/fbi.htm (listing as a major
priority "Support[ing] federal, state, county, municipal, and international partners"); United States
Department of Justice ATF, Explosives, http://www.atf.gov/content/explosives (describing "national and
international response teams"--who assist local and state law enforcement).
139 Mutual Aid Box Alarm System-Illinois, State Illinois Fire Service Emergency Response Plan (July
2008), http://www.iafc.org/files/mtlAid_StatePlanIL.pdf
140 MABAS Description at p.7.
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equipment, and translators in an ILEAS database. When a member agency requests
assistance through the ILEAS dispatch center, the dispatcher enters it into the database,
which creates an "alarm card" that forms the basis of requests for assistance.141 LEAS is
based on the success of the Northern Illinois Police Alarm System ("NIPAS") which was
formed in 1983 and now comprises some 93 municipalities in five northern-Illinois
counties cooperating under NIPAS bylaws and a formal mutual aid agreement. 142
In 2002, the Congress mandated nationwide adoption of "incident management
systems,"143 and charged the Department of Homeland Security with the responsibility
of developing a National Response Plan and National Incident Management System,144
which was issued on 16 November 2004.145 The plan requires the establishment of local,
state, and Federal Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Councils (“PPCs”).146 Both
NFPA 1600 and state law require local emergency management agencies to maintain

141
142

ILEAS, Mutual Aid, https://www.ileas.org/main/mutual-aid.
See http://www.nipas.org/. See also http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?71843-

Nipas-Est (2006 article on NIPAS recruitment, training, and equipment). "The requesting agency’s
incident commander contacts the system’s dispatching center, Northwest Central Dispatch System, a
consortiium of 16 police and fire departments in northwest Cook County. http://www.nwcds.org/, and
identifies the level of response needed. There are ten levels, each one calling for an additional five officers
to respond according to a pre-determined alarm plan. Thus, Level 1 requires five officers to respond;
Level 10 requires fifty.
“The dispatch center quickly sends the appropriate number of fully equipped officers to a pre-selected
mobilization point within the requesting agency’s jurisdiction. The incident commander also deploys a
personnel officer, who records each officer’s arrival and assigns each one as required."
http://www.nipas.org/ ("Activating the System").
143 6 U.S.C. § 314(a)(5) (giving Secretary of Homeland Security and FEMA Administrator responsibility
for "building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and local
government personnel, agencies, and authorities"). See http://www.fema.gov/national-incidentmanagement-system (providing links to NIMS resources)
144 See 6 U.S.C. § 320 (requiring "compacts" with local authorities to develop and publish standards for
deployment capabilities and personnel). See generally FEMA, National Response Framework (2d ed.
2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-250451246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf.
145 Nicholson at 494.
146 Nicholson at 501-502.
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local disaster emergency plans.147 Mutual aid agreements are an essential part of these
plans.148 FEMA assists local agencies with training.149
The Incident Command System (ICS)150 is part of NIMS and provides a method of
unified command in which all responders operate under the direction of the person in
charge of the incident. It has a brief section on organization of air operations.151
The Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act,152 authorizes the establishment of an
Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)153

E.

State and county helicopter units

One obvious institutional mechanism for providing shared helicopter assets to smaller
public safety agencies is to have the state or county provide them. The Maryland State
Police is an example. The Masschusetts State Police is more modest example.
The Massachusetts State Police makes available one of its helicopters to fly overhead
patrols for the Boston Police Department.154
The limitation on this approach is uncertain availability to meet local demands, as the
Fontana, CA experience with the San Bernadino Sheriff’s Department, shows.155

F.

The Air-One model

Air-One156 operations are headquartered at the Waukegan airport, in the northeast
corner of Illinois. It uses volunteers157 to pilot a fleet of some seven helicopters158

147
148

Nicholson at 540.
Nicholson at 541.

44 CFR § 360.2 (detailing process for applying for FEMA assistance)
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_AppendixB.pdf.
151 Id. at 101-102.
152 20 ILCS 3305/1,
153 http://www.state.il.us/iema/. See also Advisory Legal Opinion - AGO 99-22 (April 28, 1999),
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/1DFC2FBB064AB97D85256761006D4C6D;
http://www.ncsheriffs.org/documents/Mutual-Aid-Agreement-Oct2008.pdf.
154 http://www.policeone.com/news/1231356-Boston-patrols-troopers-team-up-in-copters/ (2007)
155 See § ___.
156 Air-One is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation organized under the laws of Illinois.
http://www.airsupport.org/
157 http://www.airsupport.org/ (describing volunteer pilots, tactical flight officers, and ground support
officers)
149

150

48

donated to Air-One by the Defense Department surplus program for law
enforcement.159 Air-One resources are dispatched by the Winthrop Harbor Police
Department.
Air-One’s helicopters formally are registered to police and sheriff’s departments in
Illinois and Wisconsin. Air-One provides the operational infrastructure. This
arrangement is to allow Air-One’s helicopters to qualify as “public aircraft.”160

Bell OH-58C N79PD (received 2006; operational; registered to Winthrop Harbor Police Department);
Bell OH-58C N92PD (received 2007; operational; registered to Byron, Illinois Police Department); OH-58C
N62PD (received 2007; Refurbishment and equipment additions underway; registered to Stephenson
County, Illinois Sheriff's Office. It was received from the DoD in January, 2007); OH-58C N381WC
(received 2012; refurbishment and equipment additional underway; registered to Winthrop Harbor Police
Department); Bell UH-1V N67PD (received 2009; refurbishment and equipment additional underway;
registered to Winthrop Harbor Police Department); Bell HH-1N N88SD (received 2011; refurbishment
and equipment additions underway; registered to Kenosha County, Wisconsin Sheriff's Office);
Its operations began with the donation of a Eurocopter EC135 by a private owner. The EC135 was sold in
2007. www.airsupport.org (About Air-One: Aircraft).
159 10 USC § 2576a (authorizing transfer of excess property on as-is basis); Defense Logistics Agency
Disposition Services, https://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/rtd03/leso/index.shtml (describing
authorization for disposition of excess DOD property to federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies) Defense Logistics Agency. A Defense Logistics Agency video,
http://www.dla.mil/DLA_Media_Center/Pages/newsarticle201301151140.aspx (explaining transfer of
surplus helicopters).
158

160

"Public aircraft" is statutorily defined as:

"(C) An aircraft owned and operated by the government of a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory
or possession of the United States or a political subdivision of one of these governments, except as
provided in section 40125(b)." 49 U.S.C. § 40102(41). 49 U.S.C. § 40125(b) divests an aircraft of its public
aircraft status if it is used for commercial purposes or to carry an individual other than a crewmember of
qualified non-crewmember. 49 U.S.C. § 40125(a) allows aircraft to be used by one governmental entity on
behalf of another with reimbursement without losing its public aircraft status. This is subject to a proviso
that "that no service by a private operator is reasonably available to meet the threat." 49 U.S.C. §
40125(a)(1). The Federal Aviation Regulations (“FARs”) define "civil aircraft" to exclude "public aircraft,"
14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (definitions). and define "public aircraft" as:
"an aircraft owned and operated by the government of a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or
possession of the United States or a political subdivision of one of these governments; or an aircraft
exclusively leased for at least 90 continuous days by the government of a State, the District of Columbia,
or a territory or possession of the United States or a political subdivision of one of these governments,”
but only when such aircraft are "not being used for a commercial purpose or to carry an individual other
than a crewmember or qualified non-crewmember" 14

C.F.R. § 1.1 (definitions). In addition, the
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Air-One flies public safety missions throughout northern Illinois and southern
Wisconsin. Local departments are not charged for these operations. Air-One covers its
operating costs through a combination of private donations, grants from government
agencies, and the flow of equipment donations from the federal government. Its
organization and personnel are closely integrated with law enforcement and public
safety departments.
The Air-One model offers significant advantages over the alternatives considered in this
part. It also has some shortcomings, analyzed in Part VI. Because Air-One uses
volunteer aircrew personnel, it reduces personnel costs. Because the availability of AirOne’s support does not obligate public-safety agencies to enter into contracts, it
provides flexibility to the agencies.Because Air-One helicopter services are available ondemand without requiring public safety agencies to own their own helicopters, it
significantly reduces political barriers to use.
The relationship between Air-One and public-safety agencies is not, however, entirely
arms-length, and this provides another advantage. Most of the members of Air-One’s
board of directors are public safety personnel, ranging from the sheriffs of Lake County,
Illinois and Kenosha County, Wisconsin to police chiefs and other senior lawenforcement personnel from the two states. Air-One’s operational supervision also is
conducted mainly by people holding positions in the municipal law enforcement
agencies. Beyond this means of integration between service provider and service user,
the integration is strengthened further by the policies of some public safety agencies

FAA Administrator may exempt a federal, state, or local government from any regulation if he finds that
the exemption is necessary to prevent an undue economic burden and that the unit of government has an
effective and appropriate aviation safety program. 14 C.F.R. § 11.103.
"The distinction between civil and public aircraft is that public aircraft are excepted from many FAA
regulations. " 68 Fed.

Reg. 25486-02 (May 13, 2003). For example, airworthiness, flight manual, and
C.F.R. §§ 91.7, 91.8. The same is true of the
prohibition against dropping objects that may create a hazard to persons or property. 14 C.F.R. §
91.15. The maintenance requirements in Subpart E apply only to "civil aircraft." 14 C.F.R. § 91.401(a).
On the other hand, basic flight rules apply to all aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.101. This includes VFR
weather minimums. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 ("no person may operate an aircraft") [emphasis
added].
placard requirements only apply to "civil aircraft." 14
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who are making their on-duty sworn personnel available to serve on Air-One aircrews.
Also, some public safety agencies pay the cost of fuel for specific missions.
The Air-One model offers the same advantages as contract provision of helicopter
services for EMS and ENG, while avoiding the barriers for use of these private sector
models for broad spectrum of public safety support, by relieving the public safety users
of the cost of helicopter acquisition, wages, and maintenance costs.
The question, of course, as §VI.C.1 considers, is whether this volunteer model is
sustainable. It is for volunteer fire department and for the CAP, but both them receive
substantial subsidies from different levels of government.

VI.

Extending the air one model and overcoming obstacles

Despite the attractive nature of the Air-One model, its services are not being used as
intensively by Illinois and Wisconsin public-safety agencies as they could be. This part
identifies the barriers that stand in the way of greater utilization and suggests ways to
overcome them, in light of the achievements of other public-safety helicopter operations
involving shared resources.
The major barriers to wider use of the Air-One model, both in its existing service area
and in other states, relate to educating potential requesting agencies about the utility of
helicopter support and the way to use it most effectively. Otherwise any operator like
Air-One will be either ignored or besieged with unsuitable requests that lead to
disappointment. Illinois and Wisconsin are not like California, where helicopter support
of public safety has been well-accepted for years.
The place to start is to make sure everyone understands the determinants of success. In
some cases, Air-One exemplifies these determinants; in other cases, it has more work to
do.
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A.

Determinants of success

1.
Integration of air and ground forces
Effective coordination of helicopter and ground assets is essential for effectiveness.161
This can be accomplished by direct communication between aircrew and individual
ground units, as in patrol support, or it can be accomplished by more formal, militarystyle command and control protocols.162
The key to good coordination is well-trained and experienced TFOs, and an
appreciation by ground personnel of the power of helicopter assets.
2.
Building support in the public safety community
Training police personnel to utilize helicopter assets and adopting AirOne doctrine
would greatly increase the effectiveness of helicopter assets.
What the public sees on television--the long automatic weapons, the armored vehicles,
the helmets and vests--are less important than more mundane things relating to
communication and coordination.163
To a considerable extent, good coordination of air and ground forces is a function of
good basic training for public safety departments. 164
Competition and game-playing exists in the public safety community, just like
everywhere else. In one case, a helicopter support unit declined to respond to any calls
after 11 PM, even though it had resources available. When the helicopter unit from an
adjoining jurisdiction responded to a backup call after the first unit refused, a minor
bureaucratic turf war ensued, because the first unit intended its unresponsiveness to

Tony L. Jones, SWAT Leadership and Tactical Planning 31 (1996) 31 (stressing need for effective
command to assure members work as a team) [hereinafter "SWAT"]; Tactical Primer ch. 4 ("Command
and Control Architecture") (describing effective command-and-control structures for civilian lawenforcement). “[Helicopters] with [their] reconnaissance and security assets can assist the force
commander by providing accurate information in virtually all environmental conditions and throughout
the full spectrum of conflict." FM 1-100 at 1-11. See also See also U.S. Army, Utility and Cargo Helicopter
Operations, FM 3-04.113 (FM1-113),
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_04x113.pdf [hereinafter "FM1-113"], at B-3
(specifying methods of coordinating air and ground assets).

161

162
163
164

Charles "Sid" Heal, Field Command xxv (2012) [hereinafter "Field Command"].
See SWAT 75 (explaining elements of tactical chain of command)
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build pressure from political authorities to provide additional resources. Adopting the
AirOne model would reduce such gamesmanship.
In addition to being a good framework for helicopter operations in support of public
safety agencies, the Air-One model makes it more likely training will take place on a
statewide basis. When public safety agencies own helicopter assets separately and use
them only for their own missions, they have no incentive to train the personnel of other
departments. Many public safety agencies protect their independence from each other,
even to the point of the Chicago police165 and fire departments maintaining separate
helicopter operations.
The Air-One model also provides a stronger justification for state funding of training,
less when individual departments own helicopter assets. Then, it is easy for state
legislatures and executive agencies to say, “do, and pay for, your own training.”
Public safety personnel must think of helicopters at the beginning of a crisis when they
might be useful. It does little good not to call for helicopter support until twelve or so
hours after a search has begun. Thinking, "We tried everything else and it hasn't
worked. Let's see if the helicopter can help out," in not an effective approach.
In Air-One’s case, its willingness to embrace new ideas for deploying and managing
public safety resources increased, once it added persons from the firefighting
community to its board.

B.

Fear of liability

Concern about increased liability is a major barrier to sharing helicopter resources.
Nearly every requesting agency already is concerned about liability and has insurance
coverage to protect against the risk.166

See Chicago Police Marine and Helicopter Units,
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/About%20CPD/Specialized%20Units/Marin
e%20and%20Helecopter%20Unit (describing use of two helicopters).
166 See Michael A. Brave & Steven D. Ashley, Law Enforcement Jurisdictional Issues,
http://www.ecdlaw.info/outlines/Brave%20-%20Article%20%20Managing%20the%20Risk%20of%20LE%20Jurisdictional%20Problems.pdf (discussing risk
management and other issues when law-enforcement officers operate outside their primary geographic
boundaries, pursuant to mutual aid pacts and otherwise).
165
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1.
Sources of liability from using helicopters and from failing to use
them
Naturally, when an agency is presented with an idea for new capabilities, especially if
they are to be shared, the question arises whether the assisted municipality might incur
liability that would not be covered by insurance and/or whether the assisting entity
would have insurance coverage. To some extent this may be a red herring; all public
safety agencies face liability concerns, especially with respect to allegations of police
violation of civil rights.167 Liability associated with these missteps far exceed liability for
a helicopter mishap. But careful economic analysis and quantification of risk may not
matter. Municipal decision-makers, already worried about liability for police
misconduct, may simply be risk-averse when it comes to any new source of liability.
There is little doubt that entities contracting for helicopter support may be liable for
injuries resulting from crashes.168 In Talbott v. Roswell Hospital Corp.,169 for example,
the New Mexico intermediate court affirmed judgment on a jury verdict for the victim
of a helicopter crash during a public-safety training exercise. Among other things, the
evidence showed that the hospital defendant failed to make inquiry that would have
revealed "internal problems and leadership" issues in the operation of its independent
contractor helicopter operator that would jeopardize safe operation.170
Conflicting demands on both sides need not prevent an agreement. Illinois law
expressly permits local public entities to shift liability pursuant to agreement.171 Such
agreements are common in the context of mutual aid pacts. The relevant topic for
negotiation is not speculation over liability exposure, but how it should be insured
against, considered in § Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not
found..

See See, e.g. Garcia v. O'Keefe, 825 N.Y.S.2d 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (reversing $206 million judgment
for plaintiff on police brutality claim); see generally Tactical Primer at 20-21 (reviewing indications of
increasing liability exposure for civilian law enforcement).
168 In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp.2d 279, 291-293 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extensively reviewing
caselaw establishing duty to persons on the ground).
169 192 F.3d 267 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
170 192 P.3d at 274.
171 745 Ill. Cons. Stat. 10/7-101.
167
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What should be in the spotlight of risk management is the possibility that public-safetyagency liability may be increased by failure to use helicopter assets.172
While it is plausible that a public safety agency may be liable for mishaps resulting from
helicopter support of its operations, it is also plausible that it might be liable for not
using helicopter support.
Sovereign immunity is not the barrier it once was. In Prough v. Madison County,173 the
estate of a victim sued for damages, claiming that the sheriff's department improperly
released a shooter from custody. The court explained the demise of absolute commonlaw sovereign immunity in Illinois and its replacement by a limited statutory waiver.174
Now, a unit of local government is liable in tort to the same extent as a private party
unless it can establish an immunity under the state Tort Immunity Act.175
A plaintiff’s argument would comprise three elements:
1. The public safety agency had a duty to avoid foreseeable risks of harm to the
public;
2. Failure to employ helicopter support was a wanton and willful disregard of best
practices;
3. Employment of best practices would have prevented the harm to the plaintiff.
Public safety agencies have the same duty that anyone has to avoid forseeable injury
resulting from affirmative acts.
Whether an agency also has a duty to act—a duty to protect a potential victim—
depends on whether defendant law-enforcement agencies have a “special relationship”
with the victim.176 Physicians and surgeons have a special relationship with their
patients, resulting in a heightened standard of care. Similarly, in the law enforcement
context, law enforcement agencies regularly avoid liability to members of the general
172 See generally Field Command at 7-10 (describing law enforcement "fiascos" and their potential to lead
to increased liability).
173 984 N.E.2d 1177 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
174 984 N.E.2d at 1182-1183.
175 984 N.E.2d at 1183.
176 Beers v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, ___ P.3d ___, No.
39319, 2013 WS 6184050 hns 6-8 (Idaho Nov. 26, 2013) (explaining special relationship requirement in
negligence law and finding that it did not exist between church and victim of church campout accident).
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public under the "public duty" doctrine, which can be overcome, however, by showing
that a public agency had a special relationship with the victim.177
A plaintiff seeking to base liability on failure to use helicopter support could establish a
special relationship and premise breach on failure to use best practices to protect the
public, of which the victim was a member.
Or the plaintiff could focus its breach argument on what the public-safety did instead—
conducting a high-speed vehicle chase on the ground, for example. That would premise
its breach theory on affirmative acts creating a foreseeable risk of harm.
Public safety agencies have a duty, circumscribed by sovereign immunity, to avoid
foreseeable risks of harm arising from the affirmative conduct of their employees and
contractors. That they also may have a duty to avoid foreseeable risks of harm arising
from a failure to act is arguable.178
Plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases regularly recover based on evidence that the
defendants failed to use best practices in providing care. In Rosa v. Lawrence and
Memorial Hospital, 179for example, the Connecticut intermediate court affirmed a multimillion dollar verdict for malpractice against an anesthesia provider for using the
wrong device to administer anesthesia.180 Medical malpractice caselaw can be extended
to the public-safety context only by establishing a “special relationship” between
public-safety agencies and members of the public who are injured by their practices.
Plaintiffs recover for law-enforcement “fiascos,” with the courts evading an explicit
decision on whether a special relationship was established. In such cases, avoiding
sovereign immunity flows from establishing breach of duty under a heightened
standard. In Rivera v. Garcia,181 the Illinois intermediate court reinstated a jury verdict
and held that the parents of a teenager were entitled to recover damages for injuries and

See Gates v. United States, 928 F. Supp.2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining relationship between public
duty doctrine and special relationship).
178 Bracken v. Okura, ___ F. Supp.2 ___, Civil No. 11–00784 LEK–BMK, 2013 WL 3223873 hn 24 (D.
Hawaii June 24, 2013) (distinguishing between failure to act and affirmative acts under section 1983;
granting summary judgment to defendants).
179 74 A.3d 534 (Conn. Ct. App. 2013).
180 74 A.3d at 542 (summarizing expert testimony on the standard of care).
181 927 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
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death resulting from a high-speed police chase. The evidence showed that police
officers had used an unmarked vehicle, contrary to Chicago Police Department policy.182
Gunfire ensued and intensified as other police vehicles responded.183 At trial the
plaintiff introduced police-department procedures on pursuits and the testimony of an
expert to show that the defendants "reckless, dangerous and nonconforming with
applicable police practices and that the overall management of the pursuit exhibited a
conscious disregard for the safety of others" thereby constituting willful and wanton
conduct--the standard necessary to overcome the statutory immunity.184 On the
outcome-determinative issue of proximate causation, the appellate court held that the
harm to the victims was reasonably foreseeable.185
So, in the context of this article, the first question is when would a foreseeable risk of
harm arise from failure to use helicopter assets, giving rise to a duty. The second
question is the standard according to which facts would establish a breach of the duty
under the willful-and-wanton standard--usually necessary to overcome sovereign
immunity.
The basic standard is a familiar one: a duty to avoid foreseeable risks of harm. In
Commonwealth v. Peterson,186 the Virginia supreme court applied this standard and
reversed a damages judgment in favor of the estates of victims of the 2007 Virginia Tech
shootings. The administrators of the estates had filed actions under the Virginia Tort
Claims Act187 for breach of the duty to warn arising after a foreseeable risk of harm
occurred because of initial shootings in a Virginia Tech dormitory. The jury, after being
instructed "the jury was told that if they found that the university employees should
have reasonably foreseen that injury arising from the criminal conduct of a third party
might occur but failed to warn students, the Commonwealth should be found
negligent,"188 awarded $4 million to each plaintiff.
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The supreme court, without contesting the basic principle, found that the plaintiffs had
not established breach of the duty. The court held that the university had no basis, after
the dormitory shootings, to know or reasonably to have foreseen the possibility of harm
to other students. The initial investigation indicated that the shooter had fled the area
and posed no danger to others.189
A public safety agency would be in a different, and less favorable, situation if it claimed
it had no reason to know that a high-speed car chase without helicopter support would
risk injury to the public.
Litigation over the 1993 Branch Davidian conflict near Waco, Texas resulted in rejection
of the plaintiff's claims that the government's decisions to use tear gas, tanks, its failure
to plan for a fire, all fell within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.190
Two things are notable about the litigation. First, is the basis on which the district court
rejected the claim that the absence of firefighting equipment should result in FTCA
liability: the absence of proof that armored fire fighting vehicles that were available
would have been effective.191 Second, is the use of recordings from a FLIR camera
mounted on an FBI helicopter to reject certain factual claims.192
By negative implication from the first finding, a tort plaintiff could recover if he could
show that helicopter assets were available and if they had been used in a particular
way, they would have prevented harm.
In a number of cases, plaintiffs have sought to recover under section 1983 or at common
law based on evidence that public safety agencies failed to use best practices. In Ewans
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,193 the court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed
summary judgment for a bank that reported a suspicious (but innocent) customer to the
police, resulting in a substantial overreaction by the police. The court held that the
evidence did not show that bank employees had breached their duty of care. "[O]ur
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holding is unaffected by either side's testimony of “best practices.” Negligence law is
concerned with reasonable practices, not best practices," it said.194
The results show how difficult it is to succeed on such claims, but they also show what
the analytical framework is for recovery based on failure to use helicopter assets
appropriately.
In Glass v. City of Philadelpha,195 victims of alleged police brutality in Philadelphia
sued under section 1983. They claimed that the son of one of the plaintiffs was beaten
up and then that the police retaliated for a resulting lawsuit by harassing and
intimidating the plaintiffs.196 Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged a cover-up
conspiracy and a failure by the police department to investigate their complaints.197 To
analyze the claims, the court detailed the internal organization and procedures of the
police department.198 Among other things, the court reviewed in detail procedures for
handcuffing arrestees,199 the steps taken to investigate complaints,200 and the
computerized system for tracking outstanding warrants.201
The court applied the familiar standard for determining municipal liability under
section 1983: “[P]laintiffs must identify a municipal policy or custom that amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of people with whom the police come into
contact.”202 And, of course, they must establish causation. "203 In the particular case, the
plaintiffs' theory was premised on flaws in the "sufficiency and legitimacy of the
process employed" by the police department to investigate complaints.204 The court held
that the system was "commensurate with the ‘best practices’ employed by other police
departments of similar size."205 The court found liability for certain constitutional
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violations involving detention without probable cause and for common-law false arrest,
but rejected the other claims.206
Establishing the breach-of-duty element would depend on evidence that sound
practices established in the public-safety community involve effective deployment of
helicopter assets in similar situations. Such evidence is abundant from California, where
the use of helicopter assets and procedures for coordinating air and ground forces has
been widely established.
Establishing causation is likely to be the greatest challenge.
In Kleisch v. Cleveland State University,207 the Ohio intermediate court, in an
unreported opinion, rejected a negligence claim by a victim of a rape on a university
campus. The plaintiff claimed that an understaffed campus police department, and a
failure to use available security technologies, breached the defendants’ duty of care to
her as a business invitee.208 The court held that the evidence showed that the defendant
"had acceptable standards and best practices in place at the time of plaintiff's rape,"209
sufficient to support the trial court's judgment against the plaintiff.
This case also demonstrates the essentiality of testimony that failure to deploy
helicopter assets effectively would be a failure to employ best practices.
In McCoy v. Hatmaker,210 the Maryland intermediate court affirmed summary
judgment for a municipality. A victim's estate sued for wrongful death, premised on the
failure of paramedics to use CPR after the victim was stricken by an apparent heart
attack. The evidence showed a delay in the arrival of an ambulance because of
confusion related to the exact location of the victim's vehicle, and that the paramedic
concluded that the victim was already dead and thus that resuscitation efforts were
inappropriate.211 The court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish the wanton
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and reckless disregard conduct necessary to overcome the qualified immunity granted
public safety personnel by a state statute."212
Negligence law does not hold anyone liable for failing to do the impossible. The cost of
helicopter support is a factor that gets figured into the negligence calculus. But it gets
figured in, not in terms of the most expensive way to provide helicopter support, but in
terms of as reasonable way is to provide it, as through less expensive helicopters
available on a shared basis.
2.
Immunity
Common-law or statutory immunity for governmental entities reduces liability
exposure, and public safety agencies may insure against liability. The caselaw on
governmental liability, analyzed in § VI.B, explores the role of qualified immunity
under federal and state law. Federal immunity and insurance coverage may be
available for assisting personnel--"second responders"--under the Federal Volunteer
Protection Act.213 The statute exempts from its liability operation of an aircraft,214 but it
limits the exclusion for aircraft to those "for which the State requires the operator or the
owner of the vehicle, craft, or vessel to-“(A) possess an operator's license; or
“(B) maintain insurance."215
States are preempted from imposing such requirements by the Federal Aviation Act.
It preconditions the immunity on proper state licensing, certification, and authorization
of the volunteer activities.216 It limits the immunity to volunteers of 501(c)(3)

763 A.2d at 1244.
Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 218; 42 U.S.C. § 14501; see Carol A. Rolf, Protecting the
Protectors: Liability, Insurance, and Laws Pertaining to Volunteers Involved in Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, 3 Rivier Acad. J. 1 (2007) http://www.rivier.edu/journal/RCOAJ-Spring2007/J78-Rolf.pdf [hereinafter "Rolfe"] (discussing liability and insurance issues).
214 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a)(4).
215
42 U.S.C. sec. 145003(a)(4).
216 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a)(2).
212
213

61

organizations.217 It preempts state law except to the extent it extends the immunity for
volunteers, but allows states to opt out of the immunity if they do so explicitly.218
3.
Insurance
Two concerns about insurance confront sharing operators, including Air-One. First, will
Air-One or a requesting agency have uninsured liability exposure because of the joint
nature of the missions? Second, will the use of safety pilots or pilots-in-training as
described in § VI.C.1 jeopardize insurance coverage? The answer to both questions is
“no.”
Any insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured which obligates
the insurer to pay the insured if certain events occur. Insurance policies are aleatory
contracts.219 Any conceivable insurance policy limits the risks that it covers. For example,
a policy might provide liability220 and hull221 coverage for mishaps that occur during
search and rescue missions, while excluding mishaps that occur during personnel
insertion or extraction even if they are incident to a rescue. Similarly, a policy might
include mishaps that occur during operations within a certain geographic area, and
exclude mishaps that occur during operations outside the area. Other limitations,
particularly relevant in the helicopter-sharing context, might cover a specific helicopter
only when it is being flown on missions for the agency to which it is registered and not
when it is being flown on missions for other agencies.
These are not direct limitations on helicopter operations; they do not obligate the
insured to use the helicopter in any particular way. Rather, they leave the helicopter
operator exposed financially to potential liability when it operates outside the coverage
limits of the policy.
The aviation insurance market right now is very competitive as to price and other
policy terms. It is easier for a new operator or a long-term operator entering a new
42 U.S.C. § 14505(4)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 14502.
219 In re Texas Ass'n of School Boards, Inc., 169 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2005) (contract in which promise is
conditioned on the happening of an "event of chance").
220 Liability insurance obligates the insurer to pay civil judgments to which the insured may be subject
and to pay the insured’s costs of litigation.
221 Hull Insurance obligates the insured to compensate the insured for the value or replacement cost of a
helicopter that is damaged or destroyed.
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market segment to get insurance coverage at a reasonable price. Then if the operator
proves that it has a safe operation, the insurer will renew the policy without insisting on
whatever restrictions it imposes on new customers after the market has become tighter.
Insurers are hungry for business and therefore more willing to accommodate the plans
of potential customers.222
A typical policy has a limitations-on-use section early in the policy language.223 This
section typically excludes coverage for certain operations and usually limits use of the
covered aircraft to named pilots and other pilots within the scope of an Open Pilots
Warranty (“OPW”).224
A limitations-on-use section might exclude flight training, or it might exclude lawenforcement support missions. Or, it might limit law-enforcement support to support of
particular agencies. It certainly is not feasible to add a requesting agency as a named
insured after a request for support is received. On the other hand, a straightforward
solution is within reach: an operator like Air-One can make certain that the named
insureds cover all public safety agencies within the relevant territory. Air-One itself, for
example could include all public safety agencies in northern Illinois and southern
Wisconsin. There is no reason to suppose that this would cause a material increase in
premium; the risk of a mishap is the same, and the damages and injuries likely to result
from a mishap are the same.225
Most aviation insurance policies also limit coverage to flights commanded by named
pilots226 and other pilots meeting the requirements of an “Open Pilots Waiver”
222

Conversation with Dan Ferguson.

223

“Limitations on Use:

“To be covered under this policy the aircraft must be owned, maintained or used only for the purpose
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on the Coverage Summary page." Schneider Leasing, Inc. v. U. S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc, 555 N.W.2d
838, 839 (Iowa 1996) (quoting language from policy and finding triable issues of fact).
224 See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Gormley, 77 F. Supp.2d 705, 707 (D.Md. 1999) (OPW covers all pilots
meeting specifications rather that only named pilots).
225 Conversation with Dan Ferguson.
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(“OPW”). In Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Gormley,227 for example the district court
granted declaratory judgment to a helicopter insurer. It held that the insurer was not
liable under the policy because the pilot in command was not a named pilot in the
policy and did not meet the requirements of the Open Pilot Warranty.228
Two interpretations of pilot limitations are of interest in public-safety support
helicopter operations. One favors the insured. In some states, coverage extends beyond
flights flown by named pilots and those meeting OPW requirements, unless the insurer
can prove that the unqualified pilot caused the loss. In AIG Aviation, Inc. v. Holt
Helicopters, Inc.,229 the court refused to enforce the limitations of an open pilot warranty
in the absence of proof that the pilot's lack of experience meeting the requirements of
the warranty was the cause of the accident.230
The other is a trap that favors the insurer: the language of the policy, as in Gormley, may
exclude coverage when anyone but a named insured or someone meeting the OPW
requirements "manipulates the controls" or “operates” the aircraft.231 There's no reason
•

Total
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Total reciprocating

Formatted: Font: 10 pt
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Total turbine
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In model to be insured

•

Total time last 12 months

Estimated helicopter time next 12 months. Global Aerospace, Application for Helicopter Hull and
Liability Insurance, www.global-aero.com/.../helicopterhull_and_liability_insurance_applicat... ("Pilots"
section)
227 77 F.Supp.2d 705 (D. Md. 1999).
228 Gormley, 77 F. Supp.2d at 707 (quoting OPW; pilot of helicopter, killed in crash had total time of only
250 hours in helicopters).
229 198 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
230 The Open Pilot Warranty said:
"[a]ny commercial pilot with rotary wing ratings properly certificated by the FAA having a minimum of
1,000 logged flying hours in rotary wing aircraft, including 100 hours of which are in Robinson R22
model aircraft." 198 S.W.3d at 279 (quoting open pilot warranty language). Turbine qualification was
irrelevant because the insured aircraft was a piston-engine Robinson R22.
231 ”Most policies state that the aircraft may only be OPERATED by a current and appropriately rated
pilot who is either named on the policy or one who meets the Open Pilot Warranty." Insurance Facts and
Observations, Helicopter Edition ‘08, http://www.aviationinsurance.com/images/uploads/FOFacts%20and%20Observations%20Helicopter08.pdf (explaining named-pilot and OPW limitations may
apply to any pilot operating the aircraft, not just to one serving as pilot in command);
http://www.avioninsurance.com/faq.php#600 (asserting that named pilots is the preferred approach,
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that an insurer should want such language; the only thing a rational insurer cares about
is whether the PIC is qualified.232 If, on the other hand, the language limits coverage to
qualified pilots serving as “pilot in command,” coverage would exist even if the pilot in
command lets his unrated nephew fly straight-and-level and make gentle turns. If the
language is “manipulates the controls,” it would not.
Close attention to such policy language is necessary for any helicopter operation that
establishes a pilot recruiting pipeline such as the one proposed in § VI.C.2.c)
The turbine-time requirement is likely to be the most significant barrier, at § VI.C.1
explains. The most effective way for an operation like Air-One to deal with its insurance
concerns regarding pilot coverage is to recruit a limited number of well-qualified pilots
who do not meet the turbine-time criterion and to list them on the policy as named
pilots. The insurance carrier will reevaluate his underwriting decisions according to the
detailed data submitted by the named pilot. The operator can expect a premium
increase, but it may not be as great as anticipated, and the operator will not be
confronted with the uncertainty of whether its coverage is valid.
Insurers are likely to have a benign attitude toward such an approach. First of all,
requiring significant turbine time for helicopters makes little sense. Helicopter RPM is
stabilized so, unlike with fixed-wing turbine aircraft, there is no significant engine
spool-up time to be concerned about. It is a requirement that mindlessly got carried
over from fixed wing insurance practices. 233
“There is no reason that any insurer in its right mind would oppose letting a low-time
guy fly in the left seat and log the time, whether as a safety pilot or second-in-command
or a student. Having any kind of pilot there is always better than having an empty seat.
At the very least, the left-seat guy can work the radios and perform other non-flying
duties, thus reducing the load on the PIC.
“No one would increase the rates for this or deny coverage. Everyone in the industry
knows this is how people build turbine time. The only issue would be if the left-seat

explaining that open pilot warranty covers pilots meeting certain defined requirements, and observing
that most common reason for denying claims is that an unapproved pilot was flying the aircraft).
232 Conversation with Dan Ferguson.
233 Interview with Dan Ferguson, 21 November 2013.
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guy is paying for dual instruction; that puts the operation in a different underwriting
category. If he's not paying for it, and if it's even arguably mission related, there should
be no impact on coverage or premiums.” 234
Fixed criteria as to the qualifications of named pilots do not exist. Commercial policies
involve enough money that there are actual negotiations over the terms of the policy. It
is less likely that an insurer will refuse coverage that that it would increase the
premium if the insured wants more flexibility. "I could be a named pilot for a Huey
even though I don't have a helicopter rating, but the premium would be
astronomical."235
C.

Labor markets: Establishing a pipeline for qualified personnel

Any helicopter operation depends on an adequate supply of skilled personnel,
especially pilots and mechanics. Attention to the labor supply is particularly critical for
a volunteer enterprise: what incentives exist for volunteers, despite the absence of
compensation?
1.

Engines and limits of volunteerism

Volunteerism has its limits. Volunteer fire departments are struggling all over the
United States as lifestyles and work patterns change. When most people worked on
farms or in small shops and businesses near where they lived, it was not difficult for a
volunteer firefighter to put down his work to respond to a fire. Now, is more likely that
one’s job is remote from residential communities, increasing the distance to be traveled
to respond. Moreover, employers are less likely to have a stake in ensuring emergency
services in communities other than where they operate, and therefore are less likely to
tolerate a sudden request for time off to go fight a fire.236
Any helicopter support that does not keep helicopters in the air and pilots until close on
duty proximate to the helicopter a significant part of the time can provide only limited
assistance to the patrol function and for incidents such as robberies, muggings, or
shootings that emerge during patrol or as a result of 911 calls. It simply takes too long to
round up a crew and get the helicopter to the scene. On the other hand, a volunteer
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operation has no significant limitations for assisting in barricade situations for law
enforcement, search and rescue, and disaster relief. A degree of planning is inherent in
such missions. The volunteer organization can train alongside other public safety
personnel, participate in their planning, and coordinate deployment. Thirty-minutes or
so to launch the helicopter makes little difference.
2.
Pilots
As the availability of Vietnam era military-trained helicopter pilots diminishes, an
organization like Air-One can reinforce its pipeline a pile of volunteers by taking
advantage of certain plateaus in the career pathways for civilian helicopter pilots.
As the following subsections explain, the solution lies in maintaining high standards for
PICs, while developing a pipeline for less experienced pilots to gain experience and
training necessary to meet the PIC requirements.
a)
Requirements
High standards for pilot qualifications are important for the demanding missions of
public safety helicopter support. Many public safety support missions take place at
night in rural areas where ground lighting is scarce. One cannot count on moonlight.
Flight conditions in such circumstances are largely indistinguishable from instrument
meteorological conditions ("IMC").237 Moreover, effective utilization of helicopter
capabilities require flying low and slow—flight regimes in which the skill level to effect
a successful autorotation landing in the event of an engine failure are high. Sworn
peace-officer status is necessary for pilots to be able to participate in classified antiterrorism briefings.
At the same time, high standards diminish the supply of potential volunteer pilots.
Setting and maintaining stringent standards for pilots in command, however, is not
inconsistent with providing training and development opportunities for less
experienced pilots to keep the pipeline a potential pilot volunteers flowing.
Air-One publishes two requirements for its volunteer pilots:
1. professional first-responders
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2. minimum of 1,500 hours as PIC in rotorcraft and 250 hours as PIC in turbine
powered rotorcraft, a Commercial rotorcraft certificate with Instrumentrotorcraft rating.238
Pilot recruitment poses somewhat different problems from recruitment of TFOs and
other personnel. As the minimum number of hours increases, the pool of available
pilots shrinks rapidly.
The pool of helicopter pilots with this level of experience who are sworn lawenforcement officers is even smaller. Accordingly, a program of pilot recruitment that
does not dilute the standards for pilots-in-command, while opening up the field for
more candidates is desirable.
Practices and philosophies about personnel vary widely, especially in the lawenforcement community, on the question of whether it's easier to "make a cop out of a
pilot,” or make a “pilot out of a cop."
The LAPD, for example, prefers to make pilots out of cops. So does the Fontana police
Department. LAPD requires at least five years experience as a ground patrol officer, a
private rating in either airplanes or helicopters, and 100 hours flight time before
selection as a pilot. Once an officer is selected as a pilot, however, the department pays
for his commercial flight training, and indeed conduct ground school and certain parts
of his flight training.
The Maryland State police, in contrast, regularly advertises for civilian pilots. In 2010,
most of its helicopter pilots were civilians.239
b)
Career pathways
An organization like Air-One can benefit from a plateau that exists in the career
development for professional helicopter pilots. It could offer well-trained but less
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experienced pilots the opportunity to build turbine time by volunteering to fly in the
left seat of Air-One helicopters.240
The goal of an aspiring helicopter pilot, typically, is to qualify for a flying job that pays
$80,000 to $100,000 annually. Such salaries are available in jobs comparable to public
safety support – emergency medical services and industrial operations such as
transmission line patrols and oil and gas exploration. Such positions typically require
2,000 to 3,000 hours total time, and 1,000 hours turbine time.241
First, the pilot must obtain a rotorcraft rating. This requires total flight time of 40
hours242-- usually it takes 45 to 65 hours—of flight instruction and solo time. The result
is a private pilot certificate. Then, the pilot must obtain a commercial rating, which
requires total flight time of 150 hours.243 These two steps are obtainable for civilians only
by paying for a professional pilot training program.244 The cost is comparable to that of
a college education. The most popular primary helicopter trainer, a Robinson R22, costs
on the order of $300 per hour for dual time and $250 for solo time.245 So the aspiring
pilot must have the means to pay $75,000 or more for flight training.246
During this phase, the pilot also would obtain an instrument rating, which requires
another 40 hours of dual instruction,247 some of which may be concurrent with the

Most helicopters are flown from the right seat, although some are flown from the left seat. The
discussion that follows assumes that the pilot in command is in the right seat and that the left seat is is the
copilot position in the cockpit.
241 See http://www.justhelicopters.com/tabid/255/category/1/Default.aspx [viewed 28 Nov 2013] (Air
Medical Resource Group EC135 pilot requirements: 3,000 total, 1,000 turbine; MedTrans Bell 207 pilot
requirements: 2,000 total, 1,000 turbine; PSEG electrical line patrol pilot requirements: 2,000 total, 1,000
turbine).
242 14 C.F.R. § 61.109(a) (setting aeronautical experience requirements).
243 14 C.F.R. § 61.129 (setting aeronautical experience requirements for commercial rating).
244 Unless the aspiring pilot owns his own helicopter, which is unlikely.
245 See http://www.hillsboroaviation.com/en/page/helicopter_flight_training_rates_and_fees;
http://www.midwesternhelicopter.com/rates.htm (quoting $230 per hour for R22 solo time and $40 per
hour for instructor); http://www.flymidwest.com/details.aspx?NavID=124 (quoting $295 per hour for
dual instruction in R22); http://www.corporatehelicopters.com/staticpages/index.php?page=helicopterinstruction-rates (quoting $245 her hour for solo time and $275 per hour for dual instruction).
246 See Helicopter Academy, http://www.helicopteracademy.com/ (quoting $75,125 for commercial rating
and additional $5,000 for CFI rating). Loans are available to finance the costs. See
http://www.hillsboroaviation.com/en/page/helicopter_flight_training_financing.
247 14 C.F.R. § 61.65 (specifying aeronautical experience for instrument rating).
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requirements for the commercial rating. Now, the pilot has some 200 hours, all of it
likely in piston-driven helicopters. From this point forward, the pilot can begin earning
modest compensation for flying – maybe $25-$35,000 per year at first. His immediate
goal is to build total time.
The opportunities at this stage for turbine helicopter jobs are few and far between, so
most pilots get their certified flight instructor ("CFI") rating248 and build time giving
flight instruction, or fly rides and tours in piston driven helicopters, or a combination of
the two. A flight instructor at a reasonably busy flight school can expect to fly 70-80
hours per month and acquire a thousand hours total time after a year to a year-and-ahalf.
Then, the focus has to shift to building turbine time. This can be obtained mainly by
flying with larger tour operators that fly turbine helicopters.249 Once the pilot has, say
500 turbine hours and 1,500 to 2,000 total hours, jobs in other, more demanding, sectors
become available, such as executive charter, ENG, 250 EMS, and industrial applications
such as powerline and pipeline patrols and oil and gas drilling.
c)
Safety pilots as recruitment pipeline
One possibility under discussion by Air-One’s leadership is to establish a new position
of “safety pilot,"–essentially a copilot, although none of Air-One’s helicopters require
two pilot operation. Helicopter pilots with several hundred hours and a commercial
rating would qualify. They would be trained as TFOs and then allowed to build time in
the public safety helicopters as copilots or safety pilots, building turbine hours while
undergoing further Air-One tactical training.

No additional flight time is required for a CFI rating, but a written and flight test are. 14 CFR § 61.183.
See http://www.sundancehelicopters.com/about-us/employment/ (requiring 1,000 total hours).
Sundance flies AS350 and EC130 helicopters, both turbine powered.
http://www.sundancehelicopters.com/. See also http://www.temscoair.com/pilots.php (requiring 1,000
total hours; no turbine requirement). Temsco flies Hughes 500Ds and AS350s, both turbine powered.
http://www.temscoair.com/aircraft.php. Once a pilot proves himself for a season flying rides and tours,
Temsco offers him the opportunity to move to industrial assignments such as long line operations.
250 See http://www.justhelicopters.com/tabid/255/category/1/Default.aspx [viewed 28 Nov 2013]
(Helicopters Inc. ENG full-time and part-time pilot requirements: 1500 total and 250 turbine).
248
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Once a safety pilot is selected, he she would be sworn in as a reserve deputy sheriff.
Police academy training would ensue in due course, interleaved with tactical Air-One
training, qualifying the pilot to be a sworn peace officer.
After a safety pilot completes an internal check ride, he or she would be available to fly
ferry and demonstration missions in VFR conditions–relieving the fully qualified AirOne pilots from those missions. This approach has precedent. The Maryland State
Police, for example, recruits civilian SIC pilots with a minimum requirement of 1200
helicopter hours, without a specific turbine time requirement.251
Even though Air-One is not subject to Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations,
applicable to commercial operators such as air charter and air taxi operators in the
private sector, the Part 135 requirements for pilot training252 would be a useful template
for the details of Air-One’s safety pilot program.
As § VI.B.3 explains, insurance limitations are not likely to be a barrier: a trained pilot in
the left seat is better than a non-pilot.
In this scenario, Air-One would recruit helicopter pilots who have their commercial
ratings, and who may be working as flight instructors, to volunteer for Air-One. In
exchange for their time and undergoing training for flight duties and public safety
responsibilities, pilots would have the opportunity to build turbine time without having
to pay for it.
d)
Reservations about civilian pilots
Some public-safety agencies deal with the pilot shortage problem and their preference
for all aircrew members to have law enforcement experience by accepting relatively
low-time pilots. Captain Faulkner, in Fontana, for example, is open to low time pilots.
One TFO in December 2013 has a private helicopter rating that he earned on his own
after be became a TFO. Now he has received Police Department support to work
toward his commercial rating. He was about ready to take flight test at the time of the

http://www.jsfirm.com/job/PilotRotary+Wing+Maryland+State+Police+Civilian+Helicopter+Pilot+I,+Second-InCommand+(2271)/Middle+River-Maryland/jobID_64512 [visited 28 November 2013].
252 14 C.F.R. §§ 135.291-135.301 (crewmember testing requirements); 14 C.F.R. §§ 135.321-135.351
(imposing training requirements, and defining qualifications for check pilots).
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visit. Another, younger, TFO working toward his private helicopter rating, has had a
total of 25 hours.
Substantial experience as a street officer is necessary, in Faulkner’s opinion, for TFOs
and pilots. Four reasons exist:
First, only an experienced police officer can function effectively in an airborne patrol
car. Only he can relate to the needs of the ground officers the helicopter is supporting
and understand how to fly the mission to be most effective.
Second and at least as important, is the traditionally proud and insular law enforcement
culture. "You put a kid in the cockpit who has had no experience or only a year or two
of experience as the street officer, then you invite derision: ‘pretty boys aviators.'"
Third, experience shows that some low-time civilian pilots without law enforcement
experience demonstrate a lack of concern for police work. Despite his conviction that
low-time pilots can do the job, Faulkner’s experience convinces him that a model that
recruits low-time civilian pilots cannot work. "It's well understood that what they really
want–all they want—is to build flight time toward the magic thousand hours. We tried
it once or twice, and found that such pilots were so eager to fly that they were willing to
make safety compromises with the weather. When they got up, they could fly the flight
profile requested by the TFO competently, but they were zoned out. They simply
weren't interested in law enforcement; they were interested only in flying.”
Finally, pilots without ground experience may lack peer respect necessary to integrate
ground and air-support operations. It wouldn't do any good, Faulkner’s opinion, to
recruit low-time civilian pilots and send them to the police academy, because this
would not earn the respect of the rank-and-file ground officers. Only street time earns
that. "You have to earn it”, is the mantra.
3.

Tactical Flight Officers

More than pilots, TFOs must have intimate familiarity with the missions to be
supported. Experience and training as a law-enforcement officer, an emergency medical
technician, or a firefighter is essential for this job classification. Almost everyone agrees
that relevant experience as a street cop, followed up by intensive TFO training is
necessary for the aircrew member who is going to be most involved in coordinating
with ground personnel and then suggesting appropriate flight profiles to the pilot.
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Active-duty public safety personnel are ideal because that opens up the possibility of
resource sharing by their employing agencies making them available to fly helicopter
missions.
The supply of such personnel is ample because the qualifications they need are those of
the requirements of their pre--helicopter jobs. Usually the novelty and excitement of
flying helicopter support operations represents an adequate incentive for them to
volunteer. If they are not assigned as a part of the regular duties, of course, the usual
calculus as to whether someone wants to volunteer for any activity applies—weighing
the excitement and novelty against family and educational obligations and other
alternatives for spending leisure time.
4.

Recruiting mechanics

Volunteer mechanics are desirable for the same reasons that volunteers are desirable to
fill other positions. But mechanics do not have the same incentive to volunteer that
pilots do, because pilots need to earn flight time to qualify for employment. If they
cannot do it in paid positions, many are willing to do it by volunteering.
Mechanics, like those in any other skilled profession or trade, enhance their career
prospects by gaining experience, but opportunities for mechanics to gain paid
experience in entry-level positions abound.
One possibility is to explore with A&P mechanic schools253 the possibility of internships,
so that A&P students during the last part of their training would be placed in public
safety helicopter support and work under the supervision of more senior alreadyqualified A&T mechanics.254
That would have the effect of extending the mechanic manpower available on a
volunteer basis.

See e.g. http://www.swic.edu/aviation-maintenance-technology/ (one-year program in southern
Illinois); http://www.redstone.edu/about/whyredstone.asp (one-year program in Denver area). Neither
program presently advertises an intern program.
254 See Terry Palmer, High-Tech Economy Drives Demand for Technicians, Rotor, Fall 2013 at 22, 24
(urging helicopter operators to develop relationships with A&P students, including internships).
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D.

Leadership and marketing

Charismatic, resourceful leadership makes all the difference between success and
failure. Faulkner is an example of the kind of leadership necessary when air support
operations are first established.255 Dan Bitton and the rest of the Air One leadership are
others. Burdette is an example of leadership necessary to keep it going and to grow it.
The job goes far beyond buying helicopters, recruiting personnel, and supervising them.
Effective marketing and promotion to the right constituents is essential.
The most important constituency is the ground force to be supported by helicopters.
The helicopter support operator must anticipate a natural reaction of an officer on the
street: "You're going to steal my call." The operator must demonstrate—not just
promise--that the first unit responding still remains in charge, while helicopter support
functions as a special kind of backup.
Marketing is part of it. As with any marketing, it must begin with an identification of a
unmet need and a matching of the actual capabilities of the helicopter operator with the
need; if an operator is not capable, financially or in terms of human resources, to fly
airborne patrol to support law-enforcement, it should focus on what else it can do to be
helpful. Doing those things well will build support as it builds capability to broaden its
missions, including airborne patrol if that's what it wants.
Helicopter support operators must resist an approach/avoidance conflict, lamenting the
fact that too few agencies appreciate what helicopters can do, but being reluctant to
undertake an aggressive public education and public-safety-training program because
they fear that it will stimulate requests for support they cannot meet, given their limited
resources and limited budget.
The problem, of course, is that public support for more resources, including financial
resources, depends on the public and the public safety community’s knowing about the
operation, its capabilities, and wanting more.
As agencies are developing strengthening their understanding of what helicopter
support can do, the helicopter support unit should be proactive instead of waiting to be
called out. For example, when a natural disaster occurs, the helicopter unit should not
The main question about the future of the Fontana operation is whether it is well enough established
to survive Faulkner’s retirement within about a year.
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only increase its readiness to respond to a call; it should launch over to the site in order
to offer intelligence, at least, and other types of support that it knows it can provide.
Effective marketing, however, does not mean seizing the limelight. It is far better if the
usual ground personnel and their commanders get the credit for successful mission in
the press and media and then say, "we couldn't of done it without the helicopter
support," that if the helicopter unit is the first to give a press conference bragging about
what it did.
The Fontana, California, Police Department Air Support Unit provides a good example
of how resourceful leadership sells helicopter support and makes good decisions about
affordability. It shows how effective public safety helicopter support can start. Its
history illustrates some of the crucial ingredients: a passionate, charismatic, articulate,
and resourceful advocate, good sense about cost, benefits, and how to create a win-win
situation for crucial constituencies, and alignment of political stars.
Historically, Fontana had received air support from the San Bernardino County
Sheriff’s Department, which patrolled the whole county.256 The availability of a
helicopter for the western part of the county where Fontana is located was sporadic,
because of a shortage of aircrews. Faulkner, a sergeant at the time, persuaded Fontana
and several surrounding municipalities offered to observers in exchange for the
Sheriff’s department assigning a helicopter to the western part of the county. Each
agency agreed to participate assigning an observer to fly one day p/week. The Sheriff’s
department agreed with alacrity. Faulkner was flying R44s as a part-time pilot with the
El Monte Police Department’s air support unit.
Because he was familiar with El Monte’s sharing operation, he embarked on a campaign
to enlist some surrounding municipalities, beginning with the senior officers he already
knew. His pitch was that Fontana would provide helicopter support in exchange for inkind contributions. Rialto contributed hanger space. Colton contributed $16,000 worth
of gasoline. Redlands promised to fly its fixed-wing airplane over Fontana when the
Fontana helicopter was not in the air. Everyone contributed at least one body—a pilot
or TFO.

The facts in this section results from a conversation between co-author Perritt and Capt. David
Faulkner, Fontana Police Department, 20 December, 2013.
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Faulkner’s mantra from the beginning was that any air support operation must justify
its existence by the quality of the services it provides to officers on the street. He was
and remains convinced that the key to any support operation is the quality of the key of
TFOs. If they are not enthusiastic and resourceful in making their experience as street
policemen palpable to ground forces, success is impossible. It doesn't matter what kind
of equipment is available.
Recruiting an initial team was not a problem. Faulkner had a robust network of pilots
and TFOs who flew for El Monte.
Faulkner heard that Robinson was developing a turbine version of the R44, but was not
yet sure whether it would offer a law-enforcement option. He went to see Kurt
Robinson. Together they went to the factory floor to see the first R66, as it was being
assembled. Faulkner turned to Robinson and said, "you're going to sell me that
helicopter." Robinson protested and said that it was far too early to know who the first
purchaser would be. "No," Faulkner repeated. "Listen to me. I'm telling you you're
going to sell me that helicopter." Robinson was interested in having a police department
to showcase the new model, and they made a deal.
In the experience of the Fontana unit, the first responding ground unit is perfectly
happy to have the air support set up the perimeter; that relieves him of a difficult task
and later criticism for doing it incorrectly. Also, intellectually, everyone understands
that one can set up a better perimeter from the air than from the ground.
Marketing morphs into politics. Politics obviously will determine whether funding is
available at all and, if it is, the functions it is available to support. It is well understood
in political science that public policy decisions in a democratic society depend, not only
on numbers in support and opposition, but also on how strongly members of one or the
other camp feel about an issue and how focused they are. If one side is diffuse and the
other concentrated, the concentrated side almost always wins.257
That is a particular problem for mobilizing governmental support for public safety
helicopter operations. The opposition is concentrated and passionate; supporters are
diffuse and relatively indifferent. Opponents fall into two roughly defined camps:
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CITE poli-sci literature.
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residents of the area – who are concerned about noise and the risk of a crash; and those
who are concerned about invasions of privacy and are instinctively wary of any
increase in law-enforcement capability. The second camp is particularly concerned
about the law-enforcement drone issue.258
It is not clear that anything can be done to reduce opposition from these two camps, but
proponents can be proactive to reduce the persuasiveness of their opposing arguments,
by explaining how tight procedures and intensive training reduce risks of accidents and
reduces noise pollution over populated areas.259
On the favorable side, proponents of more robust helicopter support for safety
operations can make sure that the public discourse over disaster relief, search and
rescue, and counterterrorism includes accessible and evocative materials on what
helicopters can do. In this regard, proponents should be opportunistic, press advisories
supervisors whenever a disaster strikes, an active shooter incident occurs, or someone is
rescued. Proponents also can be opportunistic with respect to mishaps, such as highspeed automobile chases and hostage situations that go wrong.

VII.

Funding sources and mechanism

There is no such thing as a free lunch. Air-One is essentially a volunteer fire
department, facing the usual challenges of any such volunteer-based operation. The
Air-One leadership is forced to decline many less critical requests simply because it
would cost too much to fly them.
Public or private funding for a full-time operation, staffed by a combination of
volunteers and paid professionals is unlikely. An operation like Air-One must piece
together support in cash and in kind from a variety of sources. It may be able to
supplement this with a steady flow of grants from the federal government, especially if
it links its training and operations to the Civil Air Patrol.
The main determinant for the level of funding required is whether the requisite
capabilities can be sustained with funding only for equipment acquisition and training,
or whether additional funding is necessary for operations.
258
259

See § XXX (discussing opposition to drones).
See Means at XXX (emphasizing flight profiles to reduce noise footprints).
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If funding for operations is necessary, how much depends on whether volunteers are
available to perform some or all of the necessary functions. An operation requiring paid
pilots, mechanics, TFOs, GSOs, and dispatchers obviously is going to have a much
bigger budget than one in which volunteers are available for some of all of these job
classifications. Even when operations rely on volunteerism, as in the case of Air-One,
the CAP, and volunteer fire departments, out-of-pocket expenditures for fuel, oil, and
maintenance may be necessary.
Air-One’s Jet Ranger helicopters burn about 40 gallons per hour, and its Huey
helicopters burn about 85 gallons per hour. Fuel for turbine engines costs $6.77 per
gallon. That means an out-of-pocket cost starting at $270-$575 for every Air-One
mission.260 In addition, Air-One incurs, as a variable cost,261 whatever maintenance is
largely dependent on the number of hours on each helicopter. All operators of
helicopters for hire262 must perform 100 hour inspections on each helicopter.263 A typical
100-hour inspection on a Huey helicopter costs XXX. In addition, the age of the
Helicopters makes parts hard-to-find, increasing maintenance costs further.

A.

Local funding

No general impediments exist to funding public safety helicopter support organized in
any of the ways considered in Part V. Funds can be made available to individual
agencies to provide their own helicopter assets; they can be provided for agencies to
enter into contractual relationships with commercial operators; they can be provided for
agencies’ contractual relationships with nonprofit operators, and they can be provided
directly to non-profits like Air-One. Economies of scale for pilot recruitment and
assignment, maintenance, and training suggest that helicopters can be utilized more
efficiently if they are provided for through shared helicopter: support—that is the thesis
of this article. In other words public-safety agencies would have less budget strain if
they support Air-One than if they provide helicopter support for themselves.

Assuming that the average mission requires three hours of flight time.
A variable cost is one that varies depending on flight time, such as fuel costs. In contrast, fixed costs
do not vary with flight time: hangar rental, helicopter purchase costs.
262 Uncertainty exists as to whether Air-One’s operations meet this test.
263 14 C.F.R. § 91.409(b).
260
261
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Restrictions exist, of course, in particularized appropriation legislation.264
In theory any one or more of several mechanisms could ensure basic funding to an
operation like Air-One:
•

Contracts and grants from local public safety agencies at the hundred thousand
dollar level

•

Grants from state or federal levels of government.

If contracts are the mechanism chosen, Air-One must be careful to avoid the tendency of
people entering into long-term contracts for helicopter services to have unrealistic
expectations about their availability.
One straightforward way to fund the direct operating costs of Air-One's operation is to
have the public service agencies reimburse Air-One for its direct operating costs when it
flies a mission for them. But that system raises concerns about Air-One losing its
nonprofit status and the reimbursements constituting a commercial relationship that
would violate the terms under which the helicopters were donated by the government.
An alternative is to have the agencies that might call on Air-One’s services to make
periodic grants, under contracts that define Air-One’s obligations in exchange for the
grants. This also might raise concerns about the nature of the revenues under the grant
and compliance with the terms under which the helicopters were received from the
Government.265
The Department of Homeland Security cannot make operating grants,266 but there is no
reason it cannot broker agreements between Air-One-like nonprofits and units of state,
county, or local government wishing to contract for its services.
More creative funding models employed by some types of public safety support
organizations are impracticable for an operation like Air-One. Many volunteer fire
departments solicit subscriptions from area homeowners and businesses, who may
have an incentive to pay it because of reduced insurance rates. Otherwise they rely on
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CITE restrictions in Homeland Security appropriation act.

265

QUOTE and CITE grant restrictions.
CITE

266

79

donations and fundraisers such as pancake breakfasts and raffles.267 Some EMS
helicopter operations such as CareFlite and Air Evac substantially supplement their
revenue streams with memberships – a kind of de facto insurance in which individuals
in the service area pay relatively small amounts annually--$60 for CareFlite in exchange
for a commitment to supplement their regular insurance coverage so that they do not
have to pay any anything for an air evacuation.268
In both of these instances, it is not difficult to persuade an individual or a small business
owner that his personal property may be directly at risk. For an operation like Air-One,
the risk is more diffuse and indirect. It is much harder for an individual contributor to
perceive that he personally or his business property might need helicopter support
services in the event of a crime, a lost or distress person, or a natural disaster.
It might be feasible, however, to employ a subscription model in which the subscribers
are the local public service agencies.
There is less resistance, however, to devoting resources to homeland security and
natural disaster relief. Accordingly, to the extent that helicopter assets can be useful for
these purposes, it is more likely that support can be obtained for them. Then, a good
organizational concept will make sure that they could be used for a broader spectrum of
public safety support. The same infrastructure of human and physical capital that
supports natural disaster relief and antiterrorism efforts also supports law-enforcement
and search-and- rescue missions.
As section VII.B suggests, the CAP funding model provides an interesting alternative
for support.

See Wayne L. Eder,How to Form a Volunteer Fire Department (Oct. 29, 2009),
http://voices.yahoo.com/how-form-volunteer-fire-department-4753572.html (also reviewing training
requirements and acquisition of surplus vehicles and other equipment). See also
http://www.fema.gov/welcome-assistance-firefighters-grant-program (summarizing FEMA grants
available for training and equipment acquisition).
267

268

Swartz interview.
80

B.

Federal funding: the Civil Air Patrol

The Civil Air Patrol (“CAP”) is a nationwide organization, defined as the "U.S. Air
Force auxiliary."269 It uses volunteer pilots organized through a military hierarchy
imitating that of the Air Force itself. It owns some of its own airplanes, but many
volunteer pilot-members fly CAP missions in their own aircraft. An important part of
its mission is recruiting young people into aviation careers and activities through its CA
P cadet program.
The CAP is not an alternative to the Air-One model, because does not fly helicopters,
and its mission is limited to search and rescue – mostly for downed aircraft. The
authorizing statute says XXX.
But, the CAP is the Air-One model, writ large.
Most interesting for purposes of this article is the magnitude and breadth of financial
support the CAP receives from the federal government. The CAP receives funding and
a general kind of oversight from Air Force headquarters. The Air Force is authorized to
provide aircraft and other equipment, to detail personnel, to pay travel expenses, and to
pay staff at the CAP national headquarters.270 It may use federal agency resources to
"provide assistance requested by State or local governmental authorities to perform
disaster relief missions and activities, other emergency missions and activities, and
nonemergency missions and activities."271
Its members are entitled to federal workers compensation,272 and the Air Force pays for
liability insurance.273

10 U.S.C. § 9441 (defining CAP as a federally chartered nonprofit corporation, not an instrumentality
of the federal government). But see 10 U.S.C. § 9442(b)(2) (making CAP an instrumentality of the United
States when carrying out mission assigned by Secretary of the Air Force).
270 10 U.S.C. § 944 (b) (enumerating types of support authorized). The Secretary of the Air Force must
prescribe regulations for administration of the CAP. 10 U.S.C. § 9448.
271 10 U.S.C. § 9443(a) (authorizing CAP to use federal agency resources, including aircraft, motor
vehicle, computers, and communications equipment for purposes quoted in text).
272 5 U.S.C. § 8141 (authorizing federal workers compensation benefits to volunteer civilian members of
the CAP).
273 10 U.S.C. § 9443(d) (obligating Secretary of the Air Force to provide funds for the cost of liability
insurance).
269
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According to its 2012 Annual Report,274 in Fiscal year 2012, the CAP had 34,000 adult
members and 26,000 cadets.275 It flew 703 search and rescue missions with 382 finds and
32 lives saved, 191 counterdrug missions and 719 other state support missions. Most of
its flight hours, however, were for orientation of CAP cadets and ROTC cadets.276 It
received $1.9 million in state funding and $27.8 million in federal operations and
maintenance funding.277
A 2012 GAO report on the CAP, required by Congress,278 urged greater use in
Homeland Security missions.279 It noted, however, that the Posse Comitatus Act may
prevent deeper CAP involvement in law-enforcement support missions.280
"In providing support to civilian law enforcement agencies, CAP is precluded from
participating in the interdiction of vehicles, vessels, or aircraft, or in search, seizure,
arrest, apprehension, surveillance, pursuit, or similar activity. CAP is also unable to
transport prisoners, contraband, and law enforcement officers in direct support of an
ongoing mission, or when hostilities are imminent. CBP officials told us that because of
these restrictions, CAP is unable to provide the type of support that is necessary for
some law enforcement activities."281
Department of Defense regulations implementing the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits
DoD personnel from:
"Evidence collection; security functions; crowd and traffic control; and operating,
manning, or staffing checkpoints . . . ."282 or from

http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/16874web1_689D49FCE91EF.pdf.
CAP 2012 Report Statistical Overview.
276 GAO Report at 10.
277 CAP 2012 Annual Report Statistical Summary.
278 See 155 Cong. Rec. H5428-01 (May 12, 2009) (Congressional debate and support for legislation
requiring the GAO study).
274
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Civil Air Patrol Homeland Security Missions (2012) (GAO 13-56). The Coast Guard,

in particular, expressed skepticism about the CAP's capability to assume an expanded
role.
280
281
282

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
32 C.F.R. § 182.6(a)(1)(iii)(A)(5).
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"Surveillance or pursuit of individuals, vehicles, items, transactions, or physical
locations . . . ."283
It excepts "A member of the Civil Air Patrol, except when performing missions
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 9442(b)."284
The most serious CAP deficiency was not mentioned in the GAO report: the fact that it
flies no helicopters. The CAP used to employ helicopters, but not since 1988.285
The Congress could provide additional support and resolve the liability question by
enacting a new statute treating Air-One-like organizations like the CAP, but under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security. Or, it could amend the CAP
statutes to encompass Air-One like organizations. Or it could authorize Air-One
activities as activities of the CAP.
The disadvantage of this approach would be that it almost certainly would reduce
likely flexibility to mold organization and operations to the differing needs of different
regions of the country.

VIII. Conclusion
Unless the public safety community, particularly the law-enforcement community,
becomes more open-minded and willing to share assets and to use lower-cost
helicopters, it is likely to find expensive turbine helicopters dedicated to patrol missions
gradually replaced by inexpensive drones. Helicopter support for search-and- rescue,
SWAT team operations, and disaster relief, on the other hand, will continue to require
larger helicopters.
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32 C.F.R. § 182.6(a)(1)(iii)(A)(6).
32 C.F.R. § 182.6(a)(2)(v)
See http://captalk.net/index.php?topic=6167.0 (blog) (discussing no-helicopter policy and reasons for

it).
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